Multiple agent possibilistic logic
- Publication Type:
- Journal Article
- Citation:
- Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 2013, 23 (4), pp. 299 - 320
- Issue Date:
- 2013-10-01
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The paper presents a multiple agent logic where formulas are pairs of the form, made of a proposition and a subset of agents. The formula is intended to mean (at least) all agents in believe that is true. The formal similarity of such formulas with those of possibilistic logic, where propositions are associated with certainty levels, is emphasised. However, the subsets of agents are organised in a Boolean lattice, while certainty levels belong to a totally ordered scale. The semantics of a set of multiple agent logic formulas is expressed by a mapping which associates a subset of agents with each interpretation (intuitively, the maximal subset of agents for whom this interpretation is possibly true). Soundness and completeness results are established. Then a joint extension of the multiple agent logic and possibilistic logic is outlined. In this extended logic, propositions are then associated with both sets of agents and certainty levels. A formula then expresses that all agents in set believe that is true at least at some level. The semantics is then given in terms of fuzzy sets of agents that find an interpretation more or less possible. A specific feature of possibilistic logic is that the inconsistency of a knowledge base is a matter of degree. The proposed setting enables us to distinguish between the global consistency of a set of agents and their individual consistency (where both can be a matter of degree). In particular, given a set of multiple agent possibilistic formulas, one can compute the subset of agents that are individually consistent to some degree. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.
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