Collaborative mechanisms for berth allocation

Wang, S; Liu, Z; Qu, X

Collaborative mechanisms for berth allocation

Wang, S Liu, Z Qu, X

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Advanced Engineering Informatics, 2015, 29 (3), pp. 332 - 338
Issue Date:: 2015-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wang, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Liu, Z	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Qu, X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0973-3756	en_US
dc.date.issued	2015-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Advanced Engineering Informatics, 2015, 29 (3), pp. 332 - 338	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1474-0346	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/119175
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This paper proposes two collaborative mechanisms between container shipping lines and port operators to facilitate port operators to make proper berth allocation decisions. In the first mechanism, assuming no transshipment, a shipping line needs to provide the port operator with the utilities associated with the start operation days of each liner route. The total utilities for all start operation days must be 0. A higher bunker and inventory cost for the shipping line means a lower utility. The port operator compensates the shipping line if its ship is scheduled on a day with negative utility and charges additional fees if the ship is scheduled on a day with positive utility. The second mechanism accounts for the utilities related to the inventory cost of transshipment containers. These two mechanisms ensure that shipping lines have no incentive to overstate or undervalue the utilities. The utilities estimated by shipping lines are much more accurate than those estimated by port operators. Hence, models for the tactical berth allocation problem incorporating the utilities provided by shipping lines lead to more efficient and equitable berth allocation plans. The utilities provided by shipping lines can also guide the decisions on operational berth allocation.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Advanced Engineering Informatics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.aei.2014.12.003	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Design Practice & Management	en_US
dc.title	Collaborative mechanisms for berth allocation	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	29	en_US
utslib.for	091199 Maritime Engineering not elsewhere classified	en_US
utslib.for	080299 Computation Theory and Mathematics not elsewhere classified	en_US
utslib.for	09 Engineering	en_US
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	090507 Transport Engineering	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Civil and Environmental Engineering
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CBI - Centre for Built Infrastructure
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CRIN - Realtime Information Networks
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	29	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. This paper proposes two collaborative mechanisms between container shipping lines and port operators to facilitate port operators to make proper berth allocation decisions. In the first mechanism, assuming no transshipment, a shipping line needs to provide the port operator with the utilities associated with the start operation days of each liner route. The total utilities for all start operation days must be 0. A higher bunker and inventory cost for the shipping line means a lower utility. The port operator compensates the shipping line if its ship is scheduled on a day with negative utility and charges additional fees if the ship is scheduled on a day with positive utility. The second mechanism accounts for the utilities related to the inventory cost of transshipment containers. These two mechanisms ensure that shipping lines have no incentive to overstate or undervalue the utilities. The utilities estimated by shipping lines are much more accurate than those estimated by port operators. Hence, models for the tactical berth allocation problem incorporating the utilities provided by shipping lines lead to more efficient and equitable berth allocation plans. The utilities provided by shipping lines can also guide the decisions on operational berth allocation.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/119175