Political economy of independent regulation in India's natural gas industry

Mahalingam, S; Sharma, D

Political economy of independent regulation in India's natural gas industry

Mahalingam, S Sharma, D

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic and Political Weekly, 2017, 52 (20), pp. 44 - 50
Issue Date:: 2017-05-20

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Mahalingam, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Sharma, D https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9421-7774	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-05-20	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic and Political Weekly, 2017, 52 (20), pp. 44 - 50	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0012-9976	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/120982
dc.description.abstract	Based on a case study of India's downstream hydrocarbon regulator, this article argues that the success or failure of independent regulation in industries supplying basic goods and services is determined by the politico-economic context in which the regulator functions. In a developing country with a large number of poor people without access to basic necessities such as water, energy, or roads, independent economic regulation by itself can deliver little, unless backed by a strong political will.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic and Political Weekly	en_US
dc.title	Political economy of independent regulation in India's natural gas industry	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	20	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	52	en_US
utslib.for	1605 Policy and Administration	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
utslib.for	16 Studies in Human Society	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Students
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	20	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	52	en_US

Abstract:

Based on a case study of India's downstream hydrocarbon regulator, this article argues that the success or failure of independent regulation in industries supplying basic goods and services is determined by the politico-economic context in which the regulator functions. In a developing country with a large number of poor people without access to basic necessities such as water, energy, or roads, independent economic regulation by itself can deliver little, unless backed by a strong political will.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/120982