Relevance in belief revision

Peppas, P; Williams, MA; Chopra, S; Foo, N

Relevance in belief revision

Peppas, P

Williams, MA

Chopra, S Foo, N

Permalink

Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Artificial Intelligence, 2015, 229 pp. 126 - 138
Issue Date:: 2015-12-03

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	r.pdf	Published Version	415.86 kB		View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Peppas, P https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0008-5505	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Williams, MA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1047-0503	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Chopra, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Foo, N	en_US
dc.date.issued	2015-12-03	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Artificial Intelligence, 2015, 229 pp. 126 - 138	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0004-3702	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/121737
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Possible-world semantics are provided for Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision, known as axiom (P). Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information ℙ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be effected by the revision of K by ℙ. Using the well-known connection between AGM revision functions and preorders on possible worlds as our starting point, we formulate additional constraints on such preorders that characterise precisely Parikh's axiom (P). Interestingly, the additional constraints essentially generalise a criterion of plausibility between possible worlds that predates axiom (P). A by-product of our study is the identification of two possible readings of Parikh's axiom (P), which we call the strong and the weak versions of the axiom. Regarding specific operators, we show that Dalal's belief revision operator satisfies both weak and strong (P), and it is therefore relevance-sensitive.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Artificial Intelligence	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.artint.2015.08.007	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing	en_US
dc.title	Relevance in belief revision	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	229	en_US
utslib.for	0801 Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing	en_US
utslib.for	0802 Computation Theory and Mathematics	en_US
utslib.for	1702 Cognitive Sciences	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Computer Science
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CAI - Centre for Artificial Intelligence
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	229	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Possible-world semantics are provided for Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision, known as axiom (P). Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information ℙ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be effected by the revision of K by ℙ. Using the well-known connection between AGM revision functions and preorders on possible worlds as our starting point, we formulate additional constraints on such preorders that characterise precisely Parikh's axiom (P). Interestingly, the additional constraints essentially generalise a criterion of plausibility between possible worlds that predates axiom (P). A by-product of our study is the identification of two possible readings of Parikh's axiom (P), which we call the strong and the weak versions of the axiom. Regarding specific operators, we show that Dalal's belief revision operator satisfies both weak and strong (P), and it is therefore relevance-sensitive.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/121737