Epistemic-entrenchment characterization of Parikh's axiom

Aravanis, T; Peppas, P; Williams, MA

Epistemic-entrenchment characterization of Parikh's axiom

Aravanis, T Peppas, P

Williams, MA

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, pp. 772 - 778
Issue Date:: 2017-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Aravanis, T	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Peppas, P https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0008-5505	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Williams, MA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1047-0503	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017, pp. 772 - 778	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9780999241103	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1045-0823	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/126350
dc.description.abstract	In this article, we provide the epistemicentrenchment characterization of the weak version of Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision - known as axiom (P) - for the general case of incomplete theories. Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information φ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be affected by the revision of K by φ. The above-mentioned characterization, essentially, constitutes additional constraints on epistemicentrenchment preorders, that induce AGM revision functions, satisfying the weak version of Parikh's axiom (P).	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP160102693
dc.relation.ispartof	IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence	en_US
dc.title	Epistemic-entrenchment characterization of Parikh's axiom	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.for	0801 Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Computer Science
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Software
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CAI - Centre for Artificial Intelligence
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

In this article, we provide the epistemicentrenchment characterization of the weak version of Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision - known as axiom (P) - for the general case of incomplete theories. Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information φ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be affected by the revision of K by φ. The above-mentioned characterization, essentially, constitutes additional constraints on epistemicentrenchment preorders, that induce AGM revision functions, satisfying the weak version of Parikh's axiom (P).

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/126350