Boosting the precision of virtual call integrity protection with partial pointer analysis for C++

Publication Type:
Conference Proceeding
Citation:
ISSTA 2017 - Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, 2017, pp. 329 - 340
Issue Date:
2017-07-10
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© 2017 Association for Computing Machinery. We present, Vip, an approach to boosting the precision of Virtual call Integrity Protection for large-scale real-world C++ programs (e.g., Chrome) by using pointer analysis for the first time. Vip introduces two new techniques: (1) a sound and scalable partial pointer analysis for discovering statically the sets of legitimate targets at virtual callsites from separately compiled C++ modules and (2) a lightweight instrumentation technique for performing (virtual call) integrity checks at runtime. Vip raises the bar against vtable hijacking attacks by providing stronger security guarantees than the CHA-based approach with comparable performance overhead. Vip is implemented in LLVM-3.8.0 and evaluated using SPEC programs and Chrome. Statically, Vip protects virtual calls more effectively than CHA by significantly reducing the sets of legitimate targets permitted at 20.3% of the virtual callsites per program, on average. Dynamically, Vip incurs an average (maximum) instrumentation overhead of 0.7% (3.3%), making it practically deployable as part of a compiler tool chain.
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