Collaborative Spectrum Sharing Through Non-Collaborative Gaming for Next-Generation Small Cells

Saadat, A; Ni, W; Vesilo, R

Collaborative Spectrum Sharing Through Non-Collaborative Gaming for Next-Generation Small Cells

Saadat, A Ni, W

Vesilo, R

Permalink

Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Access, 2017, 5 pp. 10182 - 10192
Issue Date:: 2017-01-01

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	07938606.pdf	Published Version	4.84 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Saadat, A	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Ni, W https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4933-594X	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Vesilo, R	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Access, 2017, 5 pp. 10182 - 10192	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/126905
dc.description.abstract	© 2013 IEEE. Existing spectrum-sharing schemes either allow the secondary-network users (SUs) to utilize the spectrum when primary-network users (PUs) remain idle, or require the SUs to coordinate with the PUs, causing signaling overhead. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic spectrum-sharing scheme, which enables the SUs and PUs to utilize the spectrum simultaneously, without compromising the quality of service (QoS) of the PUs and ensuring reduced signaling overhead. We formulate a multi-priority non-cooperative power-control game by considering a scenario where multiple small cell base stations belonging to either the primary network or secondary network utilize the available spectrum resources at the same time. The base stations are empowered to adjust their transmit powers in an automated manner based on measured interference, until their transmit powers are stabilized. As a key idea, a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, is designed to give the primary network priority over the secondary network for accessing the spectrum. We determine appropriate bounds for the game parameters to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. Furthermore, we propose a novel dual-mode solution to reduce the real-time signaling overhead between the networks, by minimizing the information exchange during the game required to reach an equilibrium point. Extensive simulation results are presented to prove the convergence of the game to a Nash equilibrium, along with a throughput performance analysis.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Access	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2712129	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title	Collaborative Spectrum Sharing Through Non-Collaborative Gaming for Next-Generation Small Cells	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	5	en_US
utslib.for	0806 Information Systems	en_US
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences	en_US
utslib.for	09 Engineering	en_US
utslib.for	10 Technology	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	5	en_US

Abstract:

© 2013 IEEE. Existing spectrum-sharing schemes either allow the secondary-network users (SUs) to utilize the spectrum when primary-network users (PUs) remain idle, or require the SUs to coordinate with the PUs, causing signaling overhead. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic spectrum-sharing scheme, which enables the SUs and PUs to utilize the spectrum simultaneously, without compromising the quality of service (QoS) of the PUs and ensuring reduced signaling overhead. We formulate a multi-priority non-cooperative power-control game by considering a scenario where multiple small cell base stations belonging to either the primary network or secondary network utilize the available spectrum resources at the same time. The base stations are empowered to adjust their transmit powers in an automated manner based on measured interference, until their transmit powers are stabilized. As a key idea, a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, is designed to give the primary network priority over the secondary network for accessing the spectrum. We determine appropriate bounds for the game parameters to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. Furthermore, we propose a novel dual-mode solution to reduce the real-time signaling overhead between the networks, by minimizing the information exchange during the game required to reach an equilibrium point. Extensive simulation results are presented to prove the convergence of the game to a Nash equilibrium, along with a throughput performance analysis.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/126905