Freedom of Conscience and the Value of Personal Integrity

Lenta, P

Freedom of Conscience and the Value of Personal Integrity

Lenta, P

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Ratio Juris, 2016, 29 (2), pp. 246 - 263
Issue Date:: 2016-06-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Lenta, P https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4061-4376	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-06-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Ratio Juris, 2016, 29 (2), pp. 246 - 263	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0952-1917	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/133548
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Certain philosophers have argued in favour of recognising a (moral and legal) right to freedom of conscience that includes a defeasible right of individuals to live in accordance with their perceived moral duties. This right requires the government to exempt people from general laws or regulations that prevent them from acting consistently with their perceived moral duties. The importance of protecting individuals’ integrity is sometimes invoked in favour of accommodating conscience. I argue that personal integrity is valuable since autonomy, identity (selfhood) and self-respect are all dependent on the preservation of personal integrity. I respond to two objections, one pressed by Andrew Koppelman and the other by Richard Arneson, to the claim that personal integrity is valuable, and to a further argument by Arneson to the effect that it is unfair to others claiming accommodations to exempt those with conscience-based claims.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Ratio Juris	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/raju.12126	en_US
dc.title	Freedom of Conscience and the Value of Personal Integrity	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	29	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
utslib.for	2203 Philosophy	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	29	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Certain philosophers have argued in favour of recognising a (moral and legal) right to freedom of conscience that includes a defeasible right of individuals to live in accordance with their perceived moral duties. This right requires the government to exempt people from general laws or regulations that prevent them from acting consistently with their perceived moral duties. The importance of protecting individuals’ integrity is sometimes invoked in favour of accommodating conscience. I argue that personal integrity is valuable since autonomy, identity (selfhood) and self-respect are all dependent on the preservation of personal integrity. I respond to two objections, one pressed by Andrew Koppelman and the other by Richard Arneson, to the claim that personal integrity is valuable, and to a further argument by Arneson to the effect that it is unfair to others claiming accommodations to exempt those with conscience-based claims.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/133548