Amnesty and Mercy

Lenta, P

Amnesty and Mercy

Lenta, P

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2019, 13 (4), pp. 621 - 641
Issue Date:: 2019-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Lenta, P https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4061-4376	en_US
dc.date.issued	2019-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2019, 13 (4), pp. 621 - 641	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1871-9791	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135672
dc.description.abstract	© 2019, Springer Nature B.V. I assess the justification for the granting of amnesty (the exempting of classes of offenders from criminal liability) in the circumstances of ‘transitional justice’ advanced by certain of its supporters according to which this device is morally legitimate because it amounts to an act of mercy. I consider several prominent definitions of ‘mercy’ with a view to determining whether amnesty counts as mercy under each and what follows for its moral status. I argue that amnesty cannot count as mercy under any definition in accordance with which an act or practice’s amounting to mercy lends it justificatory support, while its qualifying as mercy under certain morally neutral definitions provides no basis for considering it justified.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Criminal Law and Philosophy	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s11572-019-09493-w	en_US
dc.title	Amnesty and Mercy	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	4	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	13	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
utslib.for	2203 Philosophy	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	4	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	13	en_US

Abstract:

© 2019, Springer Nature B.V. I assess the justification for the granting of amnesty (the exempting of classes of offenders from criminal liability) in the circumstances of ‘transitional justice’ advanced by certain of its supporters according to which this device is morally legitimate because it amounts to an act of mercy. I consider several prominent definitions of ‘mercy’ with a view to determining whether amnesty counts as mercy under each and what follows for its moral status. I argue that amnesty cannot count as mercy under any definition in accordance with which an act or practice’s amounting to mercy lends it justificatory support, while its qualifying as mercy under certain morally neutral definitions provides no basis for considering it justified.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/135672