Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Xu, L; Zhang, Q; Shi, X

Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program

Xu, L Zhang, Q Shi, X

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Energy Policy, 2019, 135
Issue Date:: 2019-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Xu, L	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, Q	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Shi, X https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9653-7395	en_US
dc.date.issued	2019-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Energy Policy, 2019, 135	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0301-4215	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138743
dc.description.abstract	© 2019 Elsevier Ltd Poverty reduction and access to clean energy are two challenges highlighted in the UN Sustainable Development Goals. China's Photovoltaic (PV) Poverty Reduction Program provides an archetype model to address those two questions simultaneously. Using a tripartite game of government, enterprise and household, this paper examines the challenges that have impeded the development of China's PV poverty alleviation program. Based on an evolutionary game model and the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) model involving the three major parties, this study shows that: (1) Governmental monitoring and the active participation of both enterprises and households are essential to achieve a win-win-win outcome; (2) the government plays a leading role in monitoring and encouraging the active participation of enterprises and households and resolving the conflicts between enterprises and households; and (3) households should have a minimum share in the project. The analyses imply the following policy suggestions such as ensuring optimal path selection for all parties, avoiding the abandonment of projects, increasing households' sense of ownership and creating accessible finance.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Energy Policy	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111011	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Energy	en_US
dc.title	Stakeholders strategies in poverty alleviation and clean energy access: A case study of China's PV poverty alleviation program	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	135	en_US
utslib.for	1605 Policy and Administration	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)/Australia-China Relations Institute
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2021-12-01T00:00:00+1100
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	135	en_US

Abstract:

© 2019 Elsevier Ltd Poverty reduction and access to clean energy are two challenges highlighted in the UN Sustainable Development Goals. China's Photovoltaic (PV) Poverty Reduction Program provides an archetype model to address those two questions simultaneously. Using a tripartite game of government, enterprise and household, this paper examines the challenges that have impeded the development of China's PV poverty alleviation program. Based on an evolutionary game model and the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) model involving the three major parties, this study shows that: (1) Governmental monitoring and the active participation of both enterprises and households are essential to achieve a win-win-win outcome; (2) the government plays a leading role in monitoring and encouraging the active participation of enterprises and households and resolving the conflicts between enterprises and households; and (3) households should have a minimum share in the project. The analyses imply the following policy suggestions such as ensuring optimal path selection for all parties, avoiding the abandonment of projects, increasing households' sense of ownership and creating accessible finance.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/138743