How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets

Snyder, HT; Olsen, NL; Song, AM

How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets

Snyder, HT Olsen, NL Song, AM

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Marine Policy, 2020
Issue Date:: 2020-01-01

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	Snyder Olsen Song 2020 In press (How Cybernetics Explains Institutional Failure- Greenland Fish Market).pdf	Published Version	1.28 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Snyder, HT	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Olsen, NL	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Song, AM https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9187-5309	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2020-03-23T08:21:34Z
dc.date.available	2020-03-23T08:21:34Z
dc.date.issued	2020-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Marine Policy, 2020	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0308-597X	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484
dc.description.abstract	© 2020 Elsevier Ltd Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system. This paper argues that the conceptual development of institutional failure could be made more tenable with cybernetics – the science of control and feedback. In our case study and process tracing of a ‘market’ institution (an open-air fish market in Greenland), we show how recently implemented European food safety regulations have generated unintended negative consequences, limiting Inuit access to marine foodstuffs, altering the social characteristics of food exchange, and giving rise to underground markets for marine foods. These outcomes signal the failure of reforms to this market institution, but not necessarily why it failed. We show how cybernetic orders explain institutional failure, focusing on how command-and-control-style decisions to intervene in marine food trading and handling (considered as the first-order cybernetics) fostered public doubt for the scientific expertise underpinning the reforms, and ultimately led to a public rejection and closure of a new, hygienic, multi-million-dollar marketplace for marine foods. We clarify how second-order cybernetic elements — such as legitimacy, reflexivity, co-design, and interaction among governance actors — could have prevented the observed outcome. Our case expands the conceptual development of institutional failure and clarifies how the lens of cybernetics can inform the study and practice of institutional change in fisheries governance.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Marine Policy	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103882	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.classification	Fisheries	en_US
dc.title	How cybernetics explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air fish markets	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.for	0502 Environmental Science and Management	en_US
utslib.for	1606 Political Science	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences/Social and Political Sciences Program
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

© 2020 Elsevier Ltd Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system. This paper argues that the conceptual development of institutional failure could be made more tenable with cybernetics – the science of control and feedback. In our case study and process tracing of a ‘market’ institution (an open-air fish market in Greenland), we show how recently implemented European food safety regulations have generated unintended negative consequences, limiting Inuit access to marine foodstuffs, altering the social characteristics of food exchange, and giving rise to underground markets for marine foods. These outcomes signal the failure of reforms to this market institution, but not necessarily why it failed. We show how cybernetic orders explain institutional failure, focusing on how command-and-control-style decisions to intervene in marine food trading and handling (considered as the first-order cybernetics) fostered public doubt for the scientific expertise underpinning the reforms, and ultimately led to a public rejection and closure of a new, hygienic, multi-million-dollar marketplace for marine foods. We clarify how second-order cybernetic elements — such as legitimacy, reflexivity, co-design, and interaction among governance actors — could have prevented the observed outcome. Our case expands the conceptual development of institutional failure and clarifies how the lens of cybernetics can inform the study and practice of institutional change in fisheries governance.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/139484