Why marginality persists in a governable fishery—the case of New Zealand

Song, AM; Bodwitch, H; Scholtens, J

Why marginality persists in a governable fishery—the case of New Zealand

Song, AM Bodwitch, H Scholtens, J

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Publisher:: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Maritime Studies, 2018, 17, (3), pp. 285-293
Issue Date:: 2018-11-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Song, AM
dc.contributor.author	Bodwitch, H
dc.contributor.author	Scholtens, J
dc.date.accessioned	2020-06-24T00:32:18Z
dc.date.available	2020-06-24T00:32:18Z
dc.date.issued	2018-11-01
dc.identifier.citation	Maritime Studies, 2018, 17, (3), pp. 285-293
dc.identifier.issn	1872-7859
dc.identifier.issn	2212-9790
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/141645
dc.description.abstract	© 2018, The Author(s). This paper examines reproduction of marginality evident in fisheries. Uneven relations are widespread across geography and scale; between distant water fishing nations and coastal developing countries; between fishers on large-scale trawlers and smaller boats; between local elites and peasant operators; and between boat owners and crews working in poor and slave-like conditions. With inequality and social exclusion being such a pervasive phenomenon, we ask why do these relationships persist? Using governability, developed within the interactive governance approach, as an overarching basis for interpreting this issue, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility that marginality is not only a feature of ungovernability but might also occur in a highly governable system. To advance this insight, we apply theoretical tools associated with Marxist-Gramscian political ecology to the case of small-scale fisher exclusion brought on by the implementation of an individual transferable quota system in New Zealand’s commercial fishery. In particular, we identify social and economic relations that give rise to an accentuated capitalist structure whereby the quota-owning sector of the population (e.g., processing companies and Maori tribal organizations) control the ways in which fishers access economic benefits from their labor. Over the years, the quota system has gained acceptance as a resource management strategy, an intervention that is now ideologically hard to break away. The result is the reproduction of fishers’ exclusion, which contributes to a governable fishery, rather than an ungovernable one. This understanding casts a critical note on what we mean by governability, directing our attention to the ethical questions regarding how fisheries are to be governed and the risks that come with its pursuit.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Springer Science and Business Media LLC
dc.relation.ispartof	Maritime Studies
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s40152-018-0121-9
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Maritime Studies. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40152-018-0121-9.	en_US
dc.title	Why marginality persists in a governable fishery—the case of New Zealand
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	17
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences/Social and Political Sciences Program
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2020-06-24T00:32:13Z
pubs.issue	3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	17
utslib.citation.issue	3

Abstract:

© 2018, The Author(s). This paper examines reproduction of marginality evident in fisheries. Uneven relations are widespread across geography and scale; between distant water fishing nations and coastal developing countries; between fishers on large-scale trawlers and smaller boats; between local elites and peasant operators; and between boat owners and crews working in poor and slave-like conditions. With inequality and social exclusion being such a pervasive phenomenon, we ask why do these relationships persist? Using governability, developed within the interactive governance approach, as an overarching basis for interpreting this issue, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility that marginality is not only a feature of ungovernability but might also occur in a highly governable system. To advance this insight, we apply theoretical tools associated with Marxist-Gramscian political ecology to the case of small-scale fisher exclusion brought on by the implementation of an individual transferable quota system in New Zealand’s commercial fishery. In particular, we identify social and economic relations that give rise to an accentuated capitalist structure whereby the quota-owning sector of the population (e.g., processing companies and Maori tribal organizations) control the ways in which fishers access economic benefits from their labor. Over the years, the quota system has gained acceptance as a resource management strategy, an intervention that is now ideologically hard to break away. The result is the reproduction of fishers’ exclusion, which contributes to a governable fishery, rather than an ungovernable one. This understanding casts a critical note on what we mean by governability, directing our attention to the ethical questions regarding how fisheries are to be governed and the risks that come with its pursuit.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/141645