PASPORT: A Secure and Private Location Proof Generation and Verification Framework

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Publication Type:
Journal Article
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems, 2020, 7, (2), pp. 293-307
Issue Date:
Filename Description Size
08967030.pdfPublished version3.12 MB
Adobe PDF
Full metadata record
© 2014 IEEE. Recently, there has been a rapid growth in location-based systems and applications in which users submit their location information to service providers in order to gain access to a service, resource, or reward. We have seen that in these applications, dishonest users have an incentive to cheat on their location. Unfortunately, no effective protection mechanism has been adopted by service providers against these fake location submissions. This is a critical issue that causes severe consequences for these applications. Motivated by this, we propose the Privacy-Aware and Secure Proof Of pRoximiTy (PASPORT) scheme in this article to address the problem. Using PASPORT, users submit a location proof (LP) to service providers to prove that their submitted location is true. PASPORT has a decentralized architecture designed for ad hoc scenarios in which mobile users can act as witnesses and generate LPs for each other. It provides user privacy protection as well as security properties, such as unforgeability and nontransferability of LPs. Furthermore, the PASPORT scheme is resilient to prover-prover collusions and significantly reduces the success probability of Prover-Witness collusion attacks. To further make the proximity checking process private, we propose P-TREAD, a privacy-aware distance bounding protocol and integrate it into PASPORT. To validate our model, we implement a prototype of the proposed scheme on the Android platform. Extensive experiments indicate that the proposed method can efficiently protect location-based applications against fake submissions.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: