Coordination of Store Brand Product's Green Supply Chain Based on Negotiation

Wu, S; Wen, S; Zhou, Q; Qin, X

Coordination of Store Brand Product's Green Supply Chain Based on Negotiation

Wu, S Wen, S

Zhou, Q Qin, X

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Publisher:: MDPI
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: SUSTAINABILITY, 2020, 12, (9)
Issue Date:: 2020-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wu, S
dc.contributor.author	Wen, S https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5048-0319
dc.contributor.author	Zhou, Q
dc.contributor.author	Qin, X
dc.date.accessioned	2021-04-23T04:29:25Z
dc.date.available	2021-04-23T04:29:25Z
dc.date.issued	2020-05-01
dc.identifier.citation	SUSTAINABILITY, 2020, 12, (9)
dc.identifier.issn	2071-1050
dc.identifier.issn	2071-1050
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/148307
dc.description.abstract	<jats:p>The environmental input of a store brand product’s green supply chain plays an important role in improving the product brand image and expanding the product demand. According to the difference of the initial one-off environmental investment of the store brand product, it can be divided into three modes: direct OEM, retailer’s full participation and retailer’s partial participation. The research methods employed in this study include model establishment, numerical analysis and comparison under three entrustment modes based on retailers’ negotiation strength. In addition, sensitivity analysis was used to test the influence of parameter variations on the results. The research results show that: (i) the direct OEM mode is the best choice for retailers when the retailer is in a weak position, but it is not the best choice for the manufacturer. With the increase of the retailers’ negotiation strength, the profits of both sides will decline, causing the problem of double marginal profit decreasing; (ii) the retailer’s full participation mode is the best choice for the manufacturer when the retailer is in a strong position, but not the best choice for the retailer. It is not the best choice for both sides when the retailer is in a weak position; (iii) the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are no relative with the negotiation strength of the retailer under the partial participation mode, and the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are the same as the condition under the integrated control to achieve the best coordination effect.</jats:p>
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	MDPI
dc.relation.ispartof	SUSTAINABILITY
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.3390/su12093637
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	12 Built Environment and Design
dc.title	Coordination of Store Brand Product's Green Supply Chain Based on Negotiation
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	12
utslib.for	12 Built Environment and Design
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - AAII - Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2021-04-23T04:29:23Z
pubs.issue	9
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	12
utslib.citation.issue	9

Abstract:

The environmental input of a store brand product’s green supply chain plays an important role in improving the product brand image and expanding the product demand. According to the difference of the initial one-off environmental investment of the store brand product, it can be divided into three modes: direct OEM, retailer’s full participation and retailer’s partial participation. The research methods employed in this study include model establishment, numerical analysis and comparison under three entrustment modes based on retailers’ negotiation strength. In addition, sensitivity analysis was used to test the influence of parameter variations on the results. The research results show that: (i) the direct OEM mode is the best choice for retailers when the retailer is in a weak position, but it is not the best choice for the manufacturer. With the increase of the retailers’ negotiation strength, the profits of both sides will decline, causing the problem of double marginal profit decreasing; (ii) the retailer’s full participation mode is the best choice for the manufacturer when the retailer is in a strong position, but not the best choice for the retailer. It is not the best choice for both sides when the retailer is in a weak position; (iii) the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are no relative with the negotiation strength of the retailer under the partial participation mode, and the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are the same as the condition under the integrated control to achieve the best coordination effect.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/148307