Economics of Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing: A Backup Reservation Approach

Hou, J; Sun, L; Shu, T; Xiao, Y; Krunz, M

Economics of Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing: A Backup Reservation Approach

Hou, J Sun, L Shu, T Xiao, Y Krunz, M

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Publisher:: IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2021, 29, (2), pp. 665-680
Issue Date:: 2021-04-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Hou, J
dc.contributor.author	Sun, L
dc.contributor.author	Shu, T
dc.contributor.author	Xiao, Y
dc.contributor.author	Krunz, M
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-18T20:57:17Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-18T20:57:17Z
dc.date.issued	2021-04-01
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2021, 29, (2), pp. 665-680
dc.identifier.issn	1063-6692
dc.identifier.issn	1558-2566
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/156348
dc.description.abstract	In transitioning to 5G, the high infrastructure cost, the need for fast rollout of new services, and the frequent technology/system upgrades triggered wireless operators to consider adopting the cost-effective network infrastructure sharing (NIS), even among competitors, to gain technology and market access. NIS is a bargaining mechanism whose terms and conditions must be carefully determined based on mutual benefits in a market with uncertainties. In this work, we propose a strategic NIS framework for contractual backup reservation between a small/local network operator with limited resources and uncertain demands, and a more resourceful operator with excessive capacity. The backup reservation agreement requires the local operator (say, operator A) to reserve a certain amount of resources (e.g., spectrum) for future sharing from the resource-owning operator (say, operator B). In return, operator B guarantees availability of its reserved resources to meet the need of operator A. We characterize the bargaining between the operators in terms of the optimal reservation prices and quantities with and without consideration of their competitions in market share, respectively. The conditions under which competing operators have incentive to cooperate are explored. The impact of competition intensity and redundant capacity on performance under backup reservation are also investigated. Our study shows that NIS through backup reservation improves both resource utilization and profits of operators, with the potential to support higher target service levels for end users. We also find that, under certain conditions, operator B may still have the incentive to share its resources even at the risk of impinging on its own users.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TNET.2020.3044875
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	0805 Distributed Computing, 0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering, 1005 Communications Technologies
dc.subject.classification	Networking & Telecommunications
dc.title	Economics of Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing: A Backup Reservation Approach
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	29
utslib.for	0805 Distributed Computing
utslib.for	0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering
utslib.for	1005 Communications Technologies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-04-18T20:57:15Z
pubs.issue	2
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	29
utslib.citation.issue	2

Abstract:

In transitioning to 5G, the high infrastructure cost, the need for fast rollout of new services, and the frequent technology/system upgrades triggered wireless operators to consider adopting the cost-effective network infrastructure sharing (NIS), even among competitors, to gain technology and market access. NIS is a bargaining mechanism whose terms and conditions must be carefully determined based on mutual benefits in a market with uncertainties. In this work, we propose a strategic NIS framework for contractual backup reservation between a small/local network operator with limited resources and uncertain demands, and a more resourceful operator with excessive capacity. The backup reservation agreement requires the local operator (say, operator A) to reserve a certain amount of resources (e.g., spectrum) for future sharing from the resource-owning operator (say, operator B). In return, operator B guarantees availability of its reserved resources to meet the need of operator A. We characterize the bargaining between the operators in terms of the optimal reservation prices and quantities with and without consideration of their competitions in market share, respectively. The conditions under which competing operators have incentive to cooperate are explored. The impact of competition intensity and redundant capacity on performance under backup reservation are also investigated. Our study shows that NIS through backup reservation improves both resource utilization and profits of operators, with the potential to support higher target service levels for end users. We also find that, under certain conditions, operator B may still have the incentive to share its resources even at the risk of impinging on its own users.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/156348