A framework for truthful online auctions in cloud computing with heterogeneous user demands

Zhang, H; Jiang, H; Li, B; Liu, F; Vasilakos, AV; Liu, J

A framework for truthful online auctions in cloud computing with heterogeneous user demands

Zhang, H Jiang, H Li, B Liu, F Vasilakos, AV Liu, J

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Publisher:: IEEE COMPUTER SOC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Transactions on Computers, 2016, 65, (3), pp. 805-818
Issue Date:: 2016-03-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, H
dc.contributor.author	Jiang, H
dc.contributor.author	Li, B
dc.contributor.author	Liu, F
dc.contributor.author	Vasilakos, AV
dc.contributor.author	Liu, J
dc.date.accessioned	2022-08-11T20:35:14Z
dc.date.available	2022-08-11T20:35:14Z
dc.date.issued	2016-03-01
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Transactions on Computers, 2016, 65, (3), pp. 805-818
dc.identifier.issn	0018-9340
dc.identifier.issn	1557-9956
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/159973
dc.description.abstract	Auction-style pricing policies can effectively reflect the underlying trends in demand and supply for the cloud resources, and thereby attracted a research interest recently. In particular, a desirable cloud auction design should be (1) online to timely reflect the fluctuation of supply-demand relations, (2) expressive to support the heterogeneous user demands, and (3) truthful to discourage users from cheating behaviors. Meeting these requirements simultaneously is non-trivial, and most existing auction mechanism designs do not directly apply. To meet these goals, this paper conducts the first work on a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly. Concretely speaking, we first design a novel bidding language, wherein users' heterogeneous requirement on their desired allocation time, application type, and even how they value among different possible allocations can be flexibly and concisely expressed. Besides, building on top of our bidding language we propose COCA, an incentive-Compatible (truthful) Online Cloud Auction mechanism. To ensure truthfulness with heterogenous and online user demand, the design of COCA is driven by a monotonic payment rule and a utility-maximizing allocation rule. Moreover, our theoretical analysis shows that the worst-case performance of COCA can be well-bounded, and our further discussion shows that COCA performs well when some other important factors in online auction design are taken into consideration. Finally, in simulations the performance of COCA is seen to be comparable to the well-known off-line Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [19] .
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	IEEE COMPUTER SOC
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Transactions on Computers
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TC.2015.2435784
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	0803 Computer Software, 0805 Distributed Computing, 1006 Computer Hardware
dc.subject.classification	Computer Hardware & Architecture
dc.title	A framework for truthful online auctions in cloud computing with heterogeneous user demands
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	65
utslib.for	0803 Computer Software
utslib.for	0805 Distributed Computing
utslib.for	1006 Computer Hardware
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-08-11T20:35:13Z
pubs.issue	3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	65
utslib.citation.issue	3

Abstract:

Auction-style pricing policies can effectively reflect the underlying trends in demand and supply for the cloud resources, and thereby attracted a research interest recently. In particular, a desirable cloud auction design should be (1) online to timely reflect the fluctuation of supply-demand relations, (2) expressive to support the heterogeneous user demands, and (3) truthful to discourage users from cheating behaviors. Meeting these requirements simultaneously is non-trivial, and most existing auction mechanism designs do not directly apply. To meet these goals, this paper conducts the first work on a framework for truthful online cloud auctions where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly. Concretely speaking, we first design a novel bidding language, wherein users' heterogeneous requirement on their desired allocation time, application type, and even how they value among different possible allocations can be flexibly and concisely expressed. Besides, building on top of our bidding language we propose COCA, an incentive-Compatible (truthful) Online Cloud Auction mechanism. To ensure truthfulness with heterogenous and online user demand, the design of COCA is driven by a monotonic payment rule and a utility-maximizing allocation rule. Moreover, our theoretical analysis shows that the worst-case performance of COCA can be well-bounded, and our further discussion shows that COCA performs well when some other important factors in online auction design are taken into consideration. Finally, in simulations the performance of COCA is seen to be comparable to the well-known off-line Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [19] .

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/159973