Keep all mobile users′ whereabouts secure: a radio frequency identification protocol anti-tracking in 5G

Yin, X; Fang, B; Jin, S; Qiu, M; Vasilakos, AV; Xu, Y

Keep all mobile users′ whereabouts secure: a radio frequency identification protocol anti-tracking in 5G

Yin, X Fang, B Jin, S Qiu, M Vasilakos, AV Xu, Y

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Publisher:: WILEY
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Communication Systems, 2016, 29, (16), pp. 2375-2387
Issue Date:: 2016-11-10

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Yin, X
dc.contributor.author	Fang, B
dc.contributor.author	Jin, S
dc.contributor.author	Qiu, M
dc.contributor.author	Vasilakos, AV
dc.contributor.author	Xu, Y
dc.date.accessioned	2022-08-12T20:09:02Z
dc.date.available	2022-08-12T20:09:02Z
dc.date.issued	2016-11-10
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Communication Systems, 2016, 29, (16), pp. 2375-2387
dc.identifier.issn	1074-5351
dc.identifier.issn	1099-1131
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/160039
dc.description.abstract	In the fifth generation mobile networks (in short, 5G), radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are embedded in a growing number of personal items, especially in smartphones. The RFID authentication protocols in 5G should be anti-scanning and privacy-enhancing, because RFID tags in smartphones often suffer from leaking private trace of mobile users. However, majorities of existing RFID protocols are vulnerable to location-tracking threats, and to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on back-end servers. To eliminate these threats, we propose a hash-based mutual authentication protocol for smartphones in 5G. This protocol protects individuals' location privacy against malicious hidden scanning in public places. By the authentication of RFID readers via hash values, the proposed protocol is robust against the aforementioned threats. Additionally, our authentication efficiency on the tag side is 2H (two hash calculations), which outperforms most of previously reported solutions based on hash, and the tag stores only two vectors (one is k-bit and the other j-bit). Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	WILEY
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Communication Systems
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1002/dac.2960
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	0805 Distributed Computing, 0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering, 1005 Communications Technologies
dc.subject.classification	Networking & Telecommunications
dc.title	Keep all mobile users′ whereabouts secure: a radio frequency identification protocol anti-tracking in 5G
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	29
utslib.for	0805 Distributed Computing
utslib.for	0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering
utslib.for	1005 Communications Technologies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-08-12T20:09:01Z
pubs.issue	16
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	29
utslib.citation.issue	16

Abstract:

In the fifth generation mobile networks (in short, 5G), radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are embedded in a growing number of personal items, especially in smartphones. The RFID authentication protocols in 5G should be anti-scanning and privacy-enhancing, because RFID tags in smartphones often suffer from leaking private trace of mobile users. However, majorities of existing RFID protocols are vulnerable to location-tracking threats, and to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on back-end servers. To eliminate these threats, we propose a hash-based mutual authentication protocol for smartphones in 5G. This protocol protects individuals' location privacy against malicious hidden scanning in public places. By the authentication of RFID readers via hash values, the proposed protocol is robust against the aforementioned threats. Additionally, our authentication efficiency on the tag side is 2H (two hash calculations), which outperforms most of previously reported solutions based on hash, and the tag stores only two vectors (one is k-bit and the other j-bit). Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/160039