Revisiting key-swapping collusion attack on distributed sensor networks

Tran, TD; Agbinya, JI

Revisiting key-swapping collusion attack on distributed sensor networks

Tran, TD Agbinya, JI

Permalink

Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Proceedings - 4th International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications, SENSORCOMM 2010, 2010, pp. 381 - 388
Issue Date:: 2010-10-21

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	2010000658OK.pdf		2.17 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Tran, TD	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Agbinya, JI	en_US
dc.date.issued	2010-10-21	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Proceedings - 4th International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications, SENSORCOMM 2010, 2010, pp. 381 - 388	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9780769540962	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/16077
dc.description.abstract	Recent study has demonstrated that quite a few well-know pairwise key establishment schemes are susceptible to key-swapping collusion attack aiming to subvert crucial applications that require cooperative efforts, e.g., data fusion algorithms, routing protocols, etc. Previous works against this attack have shown their own limitations. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new countermeasure in this paper. Our approach makes good use of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives and a hidden one-way hash chain to avoid unreasonable assumptions and/or costly methods, and guarantee network scalability. The intensive security analysis reveals that the countermeasure eliminates the possibility of the attack under normal conditions with only a tiny increase in under the worst case. This susceptibility can be eliminated by some additional mechanisms. Lastly, performance overheads are well justified by theoretical analyses and simulation to be suitable for current sensor node generations. © 2010 IEEE.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Proceedings - 4th International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications, SENSORCOMM 2010	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/SENSORCOMM.2010.63	en_US
dc.title	Revisiting key-swapping collusion attack on distributed sensor networks	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.for	030107 Sensor Technology (Chemical aspects)	en_US
dc.location.activity	Venice/Mestre, Italy	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

Recent study has demonstrated that quite a few well-know pairwise key establishment schemes are susceptible to key-swapping collusion attack aiming to subvert crucial applications that require cooperative efforts, e.g., data fusion algorithms, routing protocols, etc. Previous works against this attack have shown their own limitations. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new countermeasure in this paper. Our approach makes good use of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives and a hidden one-way hash chain to avoid unreasonable assumptions and/or costly methods, and guarantee network scalability. The intensive security analysis reveals that the countermeasure eliminates the possibility of the attack under normal conditions with only a tiny increase in under the worst case. This susceptibility can be eliminated by some additional mechanisms. Lastly, performance overheads are well justified by theoretical analyses and simulation to be suitable for current sensor node generations. © 2010 IEEE.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/16077