Distributed Population Dynamics for Searching Generalized Nash Equilibria of Population Games With Graphical Strategy Interactions

Tan, S; Wang, Y; Vasilakos, AV

Distributed Population Dynamics for Searching Generalized Nash Equilibria of Population Games With Graphical Strategy Interactions

Tan, S Wang, Y Vasilakos, AV

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Publisher:: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Systems, 2022, 52, (5), pp. 3263-32672
Issue Date:: 2022-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Tan, S
dc.contributor.author	Wang, Y
dc.contributor.author	Vasilakos, AV
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-23T00:32:34Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-23T00:32:34Z
dc.date.issued	2022-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Systems, 2022, 52, (5), pp. 3263-32672
dc.identifier.issn	1083-4427
dc.identifier.issn	2168-2232
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/168112
dc.description.abstract	Evolutionary games and population dynamics are finding increasing applications in design learning and control protocols for a variety of resource allocation problems. The implicit requirement for full communication has been the main limitation of the evolutionary game dynamic approach in engineering tasks with various information constraints. This article intends to build population games and dynamics with both static and dynamical graphical communication structures. To this end, we formulate a population game model with graphical strategy interactions and derive its corresponding population dynamics. In particular, we first introduce the concept of generalized Nash equilibria for population games with graphical strategy interactions, and establish the equivalence between the set of generalized Nash equilibria and the set of rest points of its distributed population dynamics. Furthermore, the conditions for convergence to generalized Nash equilibrium and particularly to Nash equilibrium are obtained for the distributed population dynamics with both static and dynamical graphical structures. These results provide a new approach to design distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms for population games with both static and dynamical communication networks, and hence, expand the applicability of the population game dynamics in the design of learning and control protocols under distributed circumstances.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Systems
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TSMC.2021.3062827
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	08 Information and Computing Sciences, 09 Engineering
dc.subject.classification	Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing
dc.title	Distributed Population Dynamics for Searching Generalized Nash Equilibria of Population Games With Graphical Strategy Interactions
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	52
utslib.for	08 Information and Computing Sciences
utslib.for	09 Engineering
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2023-03-23T00:32:33Z
pubs.issue	5
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	52
utslib.citation.issue	5

Abstract:

Evolutionary games and population dynamics are finding increasing applications in design learning and control protocols for a variety of resource allocation problems. The implicit requirement for full communication has been the main limitation of the evolutionary game dynamic approach in engineering tasks with various information constraints. This article intends to build population games and dynamics with both static and dynamical graphical communication structures. To this end, we formulate a population game model with graphical strategy interactions and derive its corresponding population dynamics. In particular, we first introduce the concept of generalized Nash equilibria for population games with graphical strategy interactions, and establish the equivalence between the set of generalized Nash equilibria and the set of rest points of its distributed population dynamics. Furthermore, the conditions for convergence to generalized Nash equilibrium and particularly to Nash equilibrium are obtained for the distributed population dynamics with both static and dynamical graphical structures. These results provide a new approach to design distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms for population games with both static and dynamical communication networks, and hence, expand the applicability of the population game dynamics in the design of learning and control protocols under distributed circumstances.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/168112