Committee Selection Based on Game Theory in Sharding Blockchain
- Publisher:
- Springer Nature
- Publication Type:
- Conference Proceeding
- Citation:
- Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, 2022, 437 LNICST, pp. 13-28
- Issue Date:
- 2022-01-01
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| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 978-3-031-04231-7 (2).pdf | Published version | 10.21 MB |
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Blockchain has attracted the public’s attention in recent years as a decentralized system. But it suffers from low transaction throughput and poor scalability. Sharding technology is proposed to improve blockchain’s efficiency and performance using parallel processing. The key idea is to divide the miners into different shards or committees to process disjoint transaction sets. There are two kinds of committees in the sharding blockchain which bring miners different costs and rewards. One is dedicated to membership management and cross-shard transaction routing while the other is responsible for transaction validation. Miners have to decide which committee to participate in before they start working. In this paper, we study the problem of how much computational power would miners contribute to different kinds of committees in the view of game theory. We model the game as a two-stage hierarchical game and obtain the Nash equilibrium of this game. The experimental results show that both computational power limitation and system’s parameters have effects on the final equilibrium.
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