FedChain: Secure Proof-of-Stake-based Framework for Federated-blockchain Systems

Nguyen, CT; Hoang, DT; Nguyen, DN; Xiao, Y; Pham, HA; Dutkiewicz, E; Tuong, NH

FedChain: Secure Proof-of-Stake-based Framework for Federated-blockchain Systems

Nguyen, CT Hoang, DT Nguyen, DN Xiao, Y Pham, HA Dutkiewicz, E

Tuong, NH

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Publisher:: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2023, PP, (99), pp. 1-14
Issue Date:: 2023-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, CT
dc.contributor.author	Hoang, DT
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, DN
dc.contributor.author	Xiao, Y
dc.contributor.author	Pham, HA
dc.contributor.author	Dutkiewicz, E https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4268-9286
dc.contributor.author	Tuong, NH
dc.date.accessioned	2023-08-27T08:51:04Z
dc.date.available	2023-08-27T08:51:04Z
dc.date.issued	2023-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2023, PP, (99), pp. 1-14
dc.identifier.issn	2372-0204
dc.identifier.issn	1939-1374
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/171834
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we propose FedChain, a novel framework for federated-blockchain systems, to enable effective transferring of tokens between different blockchain networks. Particularly, we first introduce a federated-blockchain system together with a cross-chain transfer protocol to facilitate the secure and decentralized transfer of tokens between chains. We then develop a novel PoS-based consensus mechanism for FedChain, which can satisfy strict security requirements, prevent various blockchain-specific attacks, and achieve a more desirable performance compared to those of other existing consensus mechanisms. Moreover, a Stackelberg game model is developed to examine and address the problem of centralization in the FedChain system. Furthermore, the game model can enhance the security and performance of FedChain. By analyzing interactions between the stakeholders and chain operators, we can prove the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium and find the exact formula for this equilibrium. These results are especially important for the stakeholders to determine their best investment strategies and for the chain operators to design the optimal policy to maximize their benefits and security protection for FedChain. Simulations results then clearly show that the FedChain framework can help stakeholders to maximize their profits and the chain operators to design appropriate parameters to enhance FedChain’s security and performance.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/TSC.2023.3240235
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject	0803 Computer Software, 0805 Distributed Computing, 0806 Information Systems
dc.subject.classification	4606 Distributed computing and systems software
dc.subject.classification	4609 Information systems
dc.title	FedChain: Secure Proof-of-Stake-based Framework for Federated-blockchain Systems
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	PP
utslib.for	0803 Computer Software
utslib.for	0805 Distributed Computing
utslib.for	0806 Information Systems
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	embargoed	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2025-01-27T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2023-08-27T08:50:59Z
pubs.issue	99
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	PP
utslib.citation.issue	99

Abstract:

In this paper, we propose FedChain, a novel framework for federated-blockchain systems, to enable effective transferring of tokens between different blockchain networks. Particularly, we first introduce a federated-blockchain system together with a cross-chain transfer protocol to facilitate the secure and decentralized transfer of tokens between chains. We then develop a novel PoS-based consensus mechanism for FedChain, which can satisfy strict security requirements, prevent various blockchain-specific attacks, and achieve a more desirable performance compared to those of other existing consensus mechanisms. Moreover, a Stackelberg game model is developed to examine and address the problem of centralization in the FedChain system. Furthermore, the game model can enhance the security and performance of FedChain. By analyzing interactions between the stakeholders and chain operators, we can prove the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium and find the exact formula for this equilibrium. These results are especially important for the stakeholders to determine their best investment strategies and for the chain operators to design the optimal policy to maximize their benefits and security protection for FedChain. Simulations results then clearly show that the FedChain framework can help stakeholders to maximize their profits and the chain operators to design appropriate parameters to enhance FedChain’s security and performance.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/171834