Amnesties, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law

Lenta, P

Amnesties, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law

Lenta, P

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Publisher:: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Hague Journal on the Rule of Law

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Lenta, P https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4061-4376
dc.date.accessioned	2023-11-04T22:21:18Z
dc.date.available	2023-11-04T22:21:18Z
dc.identifier.citation	Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
dc.identifier.issn	1876-4045
dc.identifier.issn	1876-4053
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/172990
dc.description.abstract	<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The aim of this paper is to assess an objection to amnesties conferred in transitional justice contexts: that they violate the rule of law. The paper begins by setting out the objection and presenting three possible replies to it. Each is argued to be unsatisfactory. The central contention of the paper, namely that the success of the objection depends on amnesties’ terms and the reasons for which they are introduced, as well as on what conception of the rule of law is operative, is then presented. The argument that amnesties violate the rule of law on account of public international law, or national constitutions containing bills of rights, prohibiting their use without exception is then rebutted. Few amnesties violate the rule of law for this reason. Finally, the paper addresses a further rule of law-based objection to amnesties that is related to, yet distinct from, the objection that amnesties violate the rule of law. According to this second rule of law-based objection, amnesties prevent, or at least hinder, the restoration of the rule of law in post-conflict societies. This objection is countered by demonstrating that amnesties do not always promote the rule of law less effectively than trials and punishment and may even, in some cases, be essential for the restoration of the rule of law.</jats:p>
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Springer Science and Business Media LLC
dc.relation.ispartof	Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s40803-023-00199-9
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1801 Law
dc.subject.classification	4804 Law in context
dc.title	Amnesties, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.for	1801 Law
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2023-11-04T22:21:17Z
pubs.publication-status	Published online

Abstract:

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to assess an objection to amnesties conferred in transitional justice contexts: that they violate the rule of law. The paper begins by setting out the objection and presenting three possible replies to it. Each is argued to be unsatisfactory. The central contention of the paper, namely that the success of the objection depends on amnesties’ terms and the reasons for which they are introduced, as well as on what conception of the rule of law is operative, is then presented. The argument that amnesties violate the rule of law on account of public international law, or national constitutions containing bills of rights, prohibiting their use without exception is then rebutted. Few amnesties violate the rule of law for this reason. Finally, the paper addresses a further rule of law-based objection to amnesties that is related to, yet distinct from, the objection that amnesties violate the rule of law. According to this second rule of law-based objection, amnesties prevent, or at least hinder, the restoration of the rule of law in post-conflict societies. This objection is countered by demonstrating that amnesties do not always promote the rule of law less effectively than trials and punishment and may even, in some cases, be essential for the restoration of the rule of law.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/172990