Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation.

Pace, T; Koenig-Robert, R; Pearson, J

Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation.

Pace, T Koenig-Robert, R Pearson, J

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Publisher:: SAGE Publications
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Psychol Sci, 2023, 34, (11), pp. 1229-1243
Issue Date:: 2023-11

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Pace, T
dc.contributor.author	Koenig-Robert, R
dc.contributor.author	Pearson, J
dc.date.accessioned	2024-02-11T23:31:16Z
dc.date.available	2024-02-11T23:31:16Z
dc.date.issued	2023-11
dc.identifier.citation	Psychol Sci, 2023, 34, (11), pp. 1229-1243
dc.identifier.issn	0956-7976
dc.identifier.issn	1467-9280
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/175562
dc.description.abstract	Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.
dc.format	Print-Electronic
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	SAGE Publications
dc.relation.ispartof	Psychol Sci
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1177/09567976231198435
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1701 Psychology, 1702 Cognitive Sciences
dc.subject.classification	Experimental Psychology
dc.subject.classification	52 Psychology
dc.subject.mesh	Adult
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Imagination
dc.subject.mesh	Visual Perception
dc.subject.mesh	Vision, Ocular
dc.subject.mesh	Brain
dc.subject.mesh	Brain
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Imagination
dc.subject.mesh	Visual Perception
dc.subject.mesh	Adult
dc.subject.mesh	Vision, Ocular
dc.subject.mesh	Adult
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Imagination
dc.subject.mesh	Visual Perception
dc.subject.mesh	Vision, Ocular
dc.subject.mesh	Brain
dc.title	Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation.
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	34
utslib.location.activity	United States
utslib.for	1701 Psychology
utslib.for	1702 Cognitive Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health/Graduate School of Health
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health/Graduate School of Health/GSH.Clinical Psychology
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2024-02-11T23:31:15Z
pubs.issue	11
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	34
utslib.citation.issue	11

Abstract:

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/175562