The governance of manufacturers’ greenwashing behaviors: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of electric vehicles

Liu, C; Song, Y; Wang, W; Shi, X

The governance of manufacturers’ greenwashing behaviors: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of electric vehicles

Liu, C Song, Y Wang, W Shi, X

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Publisher:: ELSEVIER SCI LTD
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Applied Energy, 2023, 333
Issue Date:: 2023-03-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Liu, C
dc.contributor.author	Song, Y
dc.contributor.author	Wang, W
dc.contributor.author	Shi, X https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9653-7395
dc.date.accessioned	2024-03-18T05:19:34Z
dc.date.available	2024-03-18T05:19:34Z
dc.date.issued	2023-03-01
dc.identifier.citation	Applied Energy, 2023, 333
dc.identifier.issn	0306-2619
dc.identifier.issn	1872-9118
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176854
dc.description.abstract	Greenwashing seriously undermines the efforts toward a low carbon economy, and distorts quality information for green products including electric vehicles (EVs). However, it remains unclear how greenwashing behaviors (GWBs) can effectively be governed. Considering the formation mechanism of GWBs and collusion in EV certification processes, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model based on strategic interactions among manufacturers, certification authorities, and governments. Subsequently, we investigated the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) and corresponding conditions of each game player and then conducted a simulation to explore the participants’ system equilibrium interactions. We also evaluated vital factor changes in three stakeholders’ decision-making, including initial strategy selection, the related cost, penalty, and reward. The results demonstrate that 1) the initial strategy selection is critical to the evolution of equilibrium strategies; 2) appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms can affect decision-making speed, which takes less time to reach stable evolution, and 3) related costs are acritical factors for every player in strategy selection. High supervision costs are severe impediments to governments aiming to enforce regulations, but lower certification and production costs could prompt manufacturers and certification authorities to choose appropriate strategies. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for GWBs, makes constructive suggestions for preventing manufacturers’ greenwashing, and sheds new light on an effective governance model for EVs.
dc.language	English
dc.publisher	ELSEVIER SCI LTD
dc.relation.ispartof	Applied Energy
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.120498
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.subject	09 Engineering, 14 Economics
dc.subject.classification	Energy
dc.subject.classification	33 Built environment and design
dc.subject.classification	38 Economics
dc.subject.classification	40 Engineering
dc.title	The governance of manufacturers’ greenwashing behaviors: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of electric vehicles
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	333
utslib.for	09 Engineering
utslib.for	14 Economics
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)/Australia-China Relations Institute
utslib.copyright.status	embargoed	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2025-03-01T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2024-03-18T05:19:32Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	333

Abstract:

Greenwashing seriously undermines the efforts toward a low carbon economy, and distorts quality information for green products including electric vehicles (EVs). However, it remains unclear how greenwashing behaviors (GWBs) can effectively be governed. Considering the formation mechanism of GWBs and collusion in EV certification processes, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model based on strategic interactions among manufacturers, certification authorities, and governments. Subsequently, we investigated the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) and corresponding conditions of each game player and then conducted a simulation to explore the participants’ system equilibrium interactions. We also evaluated vital factor changes in three stakeholders’ decision-making, including initial strategy selection, the related cost, penalty, and reward. The results demonstrate that 1) the initial strategy selection is critical to the evolution of equilibrium strategies; 2) appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms can affect decision-making speed, which takes less time to reach stable evolution, and 3) related costs are acritical factors for every player in strategy selection. High supervision costs are severe impediments to governments aiming to enforce regulations, but lower certification and production costs could prompt manufacturers and certification authorities to choose appropriate strategies. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for GWBs, makes constructive suggestions for preventing manufacturers’ greenwashing, and sheds new light on an effective governance model for EVs.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176854