Controlled Link Establishment Attack on Key Pre-Distribution Schemes for Distributed Sensor Networks and Countermeasures
- Publisher:
- Auerbach Publications - Taylor & Francis Group
- Publication Type:
- Chapter
- Citation:
- Security of Self-Organizing Networks: MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET, 2011, 1, pp. 409 - 436
- Issue Date:
- 2011-01
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| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | 2009002104OK.pdf | 1.88 MB |
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Enabling security services such as encryption and authentication in distributed sensor networks (DSNs) requires that cryptographic pairwise keys must be established among communicating sensor nodes. The traditional approach to pairwise key establishment for general networks using public-key based algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman, RSA, ECC is widely regarded as prohibitively expensive to be employed in DSNs due to resource constraints of sensor nodes. The more preferable and extensively adopted alternative is key pre-distribution schemes purely based on symmetric-key techniques. However, their practical applicability is threatened by the network invading attack, whose goal is to gain partial or even full control of DSNs via illegitimate link establishment. This attack has severely ruinous impacts on applications that require collaborative efforts of sensor nodes such as data aggregation mechanisms, routing protocols, distributed voting schemes, and misbehaviour detection systems, etc. This chapter is intended to discuss the attack and its impacts. Thereafter, it focuses on recent advances in countermeasures against the attack and gives potential research directions on this issue.
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