Oberver-based Attack Detection and Mitigation in DC Microgrid Systems

Shafei, H; Li, L; Aguilera, RP

Oberver-based Attack Detection and Mitigation in DC Microgrid Systems

Shafei, H Li, L

Aguilera, RP

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Publisher:: IEEE
Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: 2023 IEEE 14th International Symposium on Power Electronics for Distributed Generation Systems (PEDG), 2023, 00, pp. 959-964
Issue Date:: 2023-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Shafei, H
dc.contributor.author	Li, L https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8485-2216
dc.contributor.author	Aguilera, RP
dc.date	2023-06-09
dc.date.accessioned	2024-05-03T01:47:24Z
dc.date.available	2024-05-03T01:47:24Z
dc.date.issued	2023-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	2023 IEEE 14th International Symposium on Power Electronics for Distributed Generation Systems (PEDG), 2023, 00, pp. 959-964
dc.identifier.isbn	9798350328233
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/178573
dc.description.abstract	This paper proposes an observer-based scheme for dealing with cyber-attacks in direct current (DC) microgrid (MG) systems. For this purpose, we derive the dynamic equations of the considered DC MGs with the Kirchhoff principles. Then, for each distributed generation unit (DGU), a bank of unknown input observers are developed to estimate the states of the neighboring DGU. By augmenting the equations of each compromised DGU with the attack signals, we detect the attacks and estimate the states of each neighbor agent. After attack detection, we mitigate the destructive effects of cyberattacks by cleaning the compromised signals. Primary and secondary controllers are designed to provide stability and obtain accurate voltage regulation and current sharing among DGUs. For this purpose, two proportional-integral controllers are developed in the local control layer of each DGU to secure voltage regulation and equal current sharing between all units. The main feature of this scheme is using a local observer to estimate the states of neighbor DGUs, which prevents the occurrence of new cyber-attacks in the communication system. The computer simulation with MATLAB/SIMULINK is conducted to show the applicability of this scheme. According to simulation results, the proposed method can detect and mitigate constant false data injection cyber-attacks in the current channels.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	IEEE
dc.relation.ispartof	2023 IEEE 14th International Symposium on Power Electronics for Distributed Generation Systems (PEDG)
dc.relation.ispartof	2023 IEEE 14th International Symposium on Power Electronics for Distributed Generation Systems (PEDG)
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/pedg56097.2023.10215110
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.title	Oberver-based Attack Detection and Mitigation in DC Microgrid Systems
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	00
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	embargoed	*
utslib.copyright.embargo	2025-08-22T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2024-05-03T01:47:21Z
pubs.finish-date	2023-06-12
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.start-date	2023-06-09
pubs.volume	00

Abstract:

This paper proposes an observer-based scheme for dealing with cyber-attacks in direct current (DC) microgrid (MG) systems. For this purpose, we derive the dynamic equations of the considered DC MGs with the Kirchhoff principles. Then, for each distributed generation unit (DGU), a bank of unknown input observers are developed to estimate the states of the neighboring DGU. By augmenting the equations of each compromised DGU with the attack signals, we detect the attacks and estimate the states of each neighbor agent. After attack detection, we mitigate the destructive effects of cyberattacks by cleaning the compromised signals. Primary and secondary controllers are designed to provide stability and obtain accurate voltage regulation and current sharing among DGUs. For this purpose, two proportional-integral controllers are developed in the local control layer of each DGU to secure voltage regulation and equal current sharing between all units. The main feature of this scheme is using a local observer to estimate the states of neighbor DGUs, which prevents the occurrence of new cyber-attacks in the communication system. The computer simulation with MATLAB/SIMULINK is conducted to show the applicability of this scheme. According to simulation results, the proposed method can detect and mitigate constant false data injection cyber-attacks in the current channels.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/178573