Australia and New Zealand in the Indo-Pacific: How and Why the Pacific Islands Look to Authoritarian China?

Chan, L-H

Australia and New Zealand in the Indo-Pacific: How and Why the Pacific Islands Look to Authoritarian China?

Chan, L-H

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Publisher:: Routledge
Publication Type:: Chapter
Citation:: China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific, 2024, 1st, pp. 65-90
Issue Date:: 2024-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Chan, L-H
dc.contributor.editor	Chan, L-H
dc.contributor.editor	Lee, PK
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-03T04:36:19Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-03T04:36:19Z
dc.date.issued	2024-05-01
dc.identifier.citation	China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific, 2024, 1st, pp. 65-90
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/179371
dc.description.abstract	As a consequence of the Radford-Collins Agreement of 1951, Australia and New Zealand have assumed a special responsibility for the security and stability of the South Pacific. Amid the geopolitical competition between China and the US in the region, however, Australia and New Zealand have in the past few years lost their overwhelming influence on the South Pacific to China. In face of this challenge, the US has stepped up its engagement with the South Pacific states in order to fill the political vacuum left by these two Australasian leading states. This chapter discusses why Pacific island countries (PICs) have recently developed cosy relations with China, which includes the 2022 Solomon Islands-China security pact, although Canberra and Wellington have recalibrated their Pacific strategy in the hope of drawing them back into the fold of the regional ‘liberal’ order. It argues that Australia’s and New Zealand’s ‘superior’ Western identity and their non-commitment to the Blue Pacific – driven by their domestic economic interests and conservative ideologies – have pushed PICs to look to China’s assistance. The regional island states perceive the great-power competition as an opportunity to have their voice and concerns over climate change heard and China as a third policy option other than relying asymmetrically on the condescending ‘big brothers’ of Australia and New Zealand.
dc.format.extent	10
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Routledge
dc.relation.ispartof	China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Politics in Asia
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.title	Australia and New Zealand in the Indo-Pacific: How and Why the Pacific Islands Look to Authoritarian China?
dc.type	Chapter
utslib.citation.edition	1st
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences/Social and Political Sciences Program
utslib.copyright.status	embargoed	*
pubs.consider-herdc	true
utslib.copyright.embargo	2025-10-19T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2024-06-03T04:36:18Z
pubs.edition	1st
pubs.place-of-publication	Oxon & New York
pubs.publication-status	Published
dc.location	Oxon & New York

Abstract:

As a consequence of the Radford-Collins Agreement of 1951, Australia and New Zealand have assumed a special responsibility for the security and stability of the South Pacific. Amid the geopolitical competition between China and the US in the region, however, Australia and New Zealand have in the past few years lost their overwhelming influence on the South Pacific to China. In face of this challenge, the US has stepped up its engagement with the South Pacific states in order to fill the political vacuum left by these two Australasian leading states. This chapter discusses why Pacific island countries (PICs) have recently developed cosy relations with China, which includes the 2022 Solomon Islands-China security pact, although Canberra and Wellington have recalibrated their Pacific strategy in the hope of drawing them back into the fold of the regional ‘liberal’ order. It argues that Australia’s and New Zealand’s ‘superior’ Western identity and their non-commitment to the Blue Pacific – driven by their domestic economic interests and conservative ideologies – have pushed PICs to look to China’s assistance. The regional island states perceive the great-power competition as an opportunity to have their voice and concerns over climate change heard and China as a third policy option other than relying asymmetrically on the condescending ‘big brothers’ of Australia and New Zealand.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/179371