When trust is not enough

Debenham, J; Sierra, C

When trust is not enough

Debenham, J Sierra, C

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 2011, 85 LNBIP pp. 246 - 257
Issue Date:: 2011-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Debenham, J	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Sierra, C https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0839-6233	en_US
dc.date.issued	2011-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 2011, 85 LNBIP pp. 246 - 257	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9783642230134	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1865-1348	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/19094
dc.description.abstract	The degree of trust that an agent has for another is the strength of the agent's belief that the other will enact its commitments without variation. A strong sense of trust may be sufficient justification for one agent to sign a contract with another when all that matters is the possibility of variation between commitment and enactment. In non-trivial contracts the agents' information is typically asymmetric with each agent knowing more about its ability to vary its actions within its contractual constraints than the other. To enable an agent to deal with the asymmetry of information we propose two models. First, a relationship model that describes what one agent knows about another, including the belief that it has in the reliability of that information. Second an integrity model where integrity is the strength of an agent's belief that the other will not take advantage of its information asymmetries when enacting its commitments. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/978-3-642-23014-1_21	en_US
dc.title	When trust is not enough	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	85 LNBIP	en_US
utslib.for	089999 Information and Computing Sciences not elsewhere classified	en_US
dc.location.activity	Toulouse France	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Software
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - AAI - Advanced Analytics Institute Research Centre
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	85 LNBIP	en_US

Abstract:

The degree of trust that an agent has for another is the strength of the agent's belief that the other will enact its commitments without variation. A strong sense of trust may be sufficient justification for one agent to sign a contract with another when all that matters is the possibility of variation between commitment and enactment. In non-trivial contracts the agents' information is typically asymmetric with each agent knowing more about its ability to vary its actions within its contractual constraints than the other. To enable an agent to deal with the asymmetry of information we propose two models. First, a relationship model that describes what one agent knows about another, including the belief that it has in the reliability of that information. Second an integrity model where integrity is the strength of an agent's belief that the other will not take advantage of its information asymmetries when enacting its commitments. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/19094