WON (Wireless Overlay Network) for Traceback of Distributed Denial of Service

Sun, Y; Kumar, A; Srinivasam, S

WON (Wireless Overlay Network) for Traceback of Distributed Denial of Service

Sun, Y Kumar, A Srinivasam, S

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Publication Type:: Conference
Issue Date:: 2007-03-12T22:05:43Z

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Sun, Y	en_AU
dc.contributor.author	Kumar, A	en_AU
dc.contributor.author	Srinivasam, S	en_AU
dc.date.accessioned	2007-03-12T22:05:43Z
dc.date.accessioned	2012-12-15T02:29:31Z
dc.date.available	2007-03-12T22:05:43Z
dc.date.available	2012-12-15T02:29:31Z
dc.date.issued	2007-03-12T22:05:43Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/19590
dc.description.abstract	This article presents an incremental and scalable solution for tracing Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. Our approach allows the victim to identify the network paths traversed by attack traffic without requiring the support from ISP or knowledge of the network topology. In contrast to previous probabilistic packet marking work, our approach has no false positive and fixed computation overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack paths. Furthermore, the volume of attack packets required to reconstruct the attack path is dramatically less.	en_AU
dc.format.extent	251534 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_AU
dc.relation.replaces	http://hdl.handle.net/2100/134
dc.title	WON (Wireless Overlay Network) for Traceback of Distributed Denial of Service	en_AU
dc.type	Conference
utslib.copyright.status	open_access

Abstract:

This article presents an incremental and scalable solution for tracing Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. Our approach allows the victim to identify the network paths traversed by attack traffic without requiring the support from ISP or knowledge of the network topology. In contrast to previous probabilistic packet marking work, our approach has no false positive and fixed computation overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack paths. Furthermore, the volume of attack packets required to reconstruct the attack path is dramatically less.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/19590