Uncovering Control Mechanisms in Contractual Joint Ventures in China

Publisher:
Virtus Netepress
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Citation:
Corporate Ownership & Control, 2013, 10 (2), pp. 114 - 120
Issue Date:
2013-01
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the paper examines the control mechanisms within CJV non-equity alliances, enhancing our knowledge of one of the most important yet least understood form of foreign investment in China. The findings also help foreign investors to better understand how to use CJVs as an organizational vehicle to enter Chinese market. Zhen Chen and Fei Guo study the determinants of executive compensation in listed firms in China between 2002 and 2005. They find that both agency theory and managerialism hold true in Chinese listed companies. Compensation contract is the result of the game by stockholders and managers.
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