Conducting International Authority: Hammarskjold, the Great Powers and the Suez Crisis

Peevers, CE

Conducting International Authority: Hammarskjold, the Great Powers and the Suez Crisis

Peevers, CE

Permalink

Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: London Review of International Law, 2013, 1 (1), pp. 131 - 141
Issue Date:: 2013-01

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	2013001226OK.pdf		633.9 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Peevers, CE	en_US
dc.date.issued	2013-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	London Review of International Law, 2013, 1 (1), pp. 131 - 141	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	2050-6325	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/27381
dc.description.abstract	Anne Orfords International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect traces the lineage of international executive authority from its constitutive articulations, as practice, by reading Dag Hammarskjölds archives of office. Through her self-conscious historical accounting, Orford asks us to reconsider the received narrative of the emergence of the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept. The use of case studiesthe Suez and Congo crisesis not to facilitate a comparison with contemporary practices of protection, but rather to provide a foundation from which the reader can trace the construction of the R2P concept. In these remarks, I discuss how additional archival sources can add to Orfords account of the practices of international executive authority. These additional sources help to situate Hammarskjölds practices in relation to Great Power. I also seek to expand the basis of the case study account Orford providestaking the Suez Crisis as the subject of my commentsby examining the practices of authority not just as justification and rationalisation, but also as conduct.1 The question of conduct requires consideration of who `conducts authority in two senses: as conduct and as orchestration. Through such an account, tensions over conducting, composing, playing and reading become apparent, all of which might be seen as aspects of practice, but not all by the same individual nor indeed in fixed positions. By highlighting the orchestral aspects of `conducting I do not suggest passivity or subservience to Great Power, but imagine instead an interplay which, despite its tensions, seeks overall to produce a coherent form of performance, a harmony.	en_US
dc.publisher	Oxford University Press	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	London Review of International Law	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1093/lril/lrt006	en_US
dc.title	Conducting International Authority: Hammarskjold, the Great Powers and the Suez Crisis	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
utslib.for	1899 Other Law and Legal Studies	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.volume	1	en_US

Abstract:

Anne Orfords International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect traces the lineage of international executive authority from its constitutive articulations, as practice, by reading Dag Hammarskjölds archives of office. Through her self-conscious historical accounting, Orford asks us to reconsider the received narrative of the emergence of the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept. The use of case studiesthe Suez and Congo crisesis not to facilitate a comparison with contemporary practices of protection, but rather to provide a foundation from which the reader can trace the construction of the R2P concept. In these remarks, I discuss how additional archival sources can add to Orfords account of the practices of international executive authority. These additional sources help to situate Hammarskjölds practices in relation to Great Power. I also seek to expand the basis of the case study account Orford providestaking the Suez Crisis as the subject of my commentsby examining the practices of authority not just as justification and rationalisation, but also as conduct.1 The question of conduct requires consideration of who `conducts authority in two senses: as conduct and as orchestration. Through such an account, tensions over conducting, composing, playing and reading become apparent, all of which might be seen as aspects of practice, but not all by the same individual nor indeed in fixed positions. By highlighting the orchestral aspects of `conducting I do not suggest passivity or subservience to Great Power, but imagine instead an interplay which, despite its tensions, seeks overall to produce a coherent form of performance, a harmony.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/27381