Constructive models for contraction with intransitive plausibility indifference

Peppas, P; Williams, MA

Constructive models for contraction with intransitive plausibility indifference

Peppas, P

Williams, MA

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2014, 8761 pp. 355 - 367
Issue Date:: 2014-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Peppas, P https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0008-5505	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Williams, MA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1047-0503	en_US
dc.date.issued	2014-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2014, 8761 pp. 355 - 367	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0302-9743	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/35472
dc.description.abstract	© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014. Plausibility rankings play a central role in modeling Belief Change, and they take different forms depending on the type of belief change under consideration: preorders on possible worlds, epistemic entrenchments, etc. A common feature of all these structures is that plausibility indifference is assumed to be transitive. In a previous article, [7], we argued that this is not always the case, and we introduced new sets of postulates for revision and contraction (weaker variants of the classical AGM postulates), that are liberated from the indifference transitivity assumption. Herein we complete the task by making the necessary adjustments to the epistemic entrenchment and the partial meet models. In particular we lift the indifference transitivity assumption from both these two models, and we establish representation results connecting the weaker models with the weaker postulates for contraction introduced in [7].	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing	en_US
dc.title	Constructive models for contraction with intransitive plausibility indifference	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	8761	en_US
utslib.for	0806 Information Systems	en_US
utslib.for	080101 Adaptive Agents and Intelligent Robotics	en_US
utslib.for	150302 Business Information Systems	en_US
utslib.for	150307 Innovation and Technology Management	en_US
dc.location.activity	Madeira - Portugal - Universidade da Madeira
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Computer Science
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CAI - Centre for Artificial Intelligence
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	8761	en_US

Abstract:

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014. Plausibility rankings play a central role in modeling Belief Change, and they take different forms depending on the type of belief change under consideration: preorders on possible worlds, epistemic entrenchments, etc. A common feature of all these structures is that plausibility indifference is assumed to be transitive. In a previous article, [7], we argued that this is not always the case, and we introduced new sets of postulates for revision and contraction (weaker variants of the classical AGM postulates), that are liberated from the indifference transitivity assumption. Herein we complete the task by making the necessary adjustments to the epistemic entrenchment and the partial meet models. In particular we lift the indifference transitivity assumption from both these two models, and we establish representation results connecting the weaker models with the weaker postulates for contraction introduced in [7].

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/35472