ENDL: A logical framework for verifying secure transaction protocols

Chen, Q; Zhang, C; Zhang, S

ENDL: A logical framework for verifying secure transaction protocols

Chen, Q Zhang, C

Zhang, S

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Knowledge and Information Systems, 2005, 7 (1), pp. 84 - 109
Issue Date:: 2005-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Chen, Q	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, C https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5715-7154	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, S	en_US
dc.date.issued	2005-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Knowledge and Information Systems, 2005, 7 (1), pp. 84 - 109	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0219-1377	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/4116
dc.description.abstract	This paper proposes a new logic for verifying secure transaction protocols. We have named this logic the ENDL (extension of non-monotonic dynamic logic). In this logic, timestamps and signed certificates are used for protecting against replays of old keys or the substitution of bogus keys. The logic is useful for verifying the authentication properties of secure protocols, and especially for protecting data integrity. To evaluate the logic, three practical instances of secure protocols are illustrated. This evaluation demonstrates that the ENDL is effective and promising. © 2004 Springer-Verlag London Ltd.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP0343109
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP0449535
dc.relation.ispartof	Knowledge and Information Systems	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1007/s10115-003-0127-4	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Information Systems	en_US
dc.title	ENDL: A logical framework for verifying secure transaction protocols	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	7	en_US
utslib.for	0801 Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing	en_US
utslib.for	0806 Information Systems	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - ACRI - Australia China Relations Institute
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CAI - Centre for Artificial Intelligence
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	7	en_US

Abstract:

This paper proposes a new logic for verifying secure transaction protocols. We have named this logic the ENDL (extension of non-monotonic dynamic logic). In this logic, timestamps and signed certificates are used for protecting against replays of old keys or the substitution of bogus keys. The logic is useful for verifying the authentication properties of secure protocols, and especially for protecting data integrity. To evaluate the logic, three practical instances of secure protocols are illustrated. This evaluation demonstrates that the ENDL is effective and promising. © 2004 Springer-Verlag London Ltd.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/4116