Detecting collusion attacks in security protocols

Chen, Q; Chen, YPP; Zhang, S; Zhang, C

Detecting collusion attacks in security protocols

Chen, Q Chen, YPP Zhang, S Zhang, C

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2006, 3841 LNCS pp. 297 - 306
Issue Date:: 2006-07-06

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Chen, Q	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Chen, YPP	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, C https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5715-7154	en_US
dc.date.issued	2006-07-06	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2006, 3841 LNCS pp. 297 - 306	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	3540311424	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9783540311423	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0302-9743	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/4936
dc.description.abstract	Security protocols have been widely used to safeguard secure electronic transactions. We usually assume that principals are credible and shall not maliciously disclose their individual secrets to someone else. Nevertheless, it is impractical to completely ignore the possibility that some principals may collude in private to achieve a fraudulent or illegal purpose. Therefore, it is critical to address the possibility of collusion attacks in order to correctly analyse security protocols. This paper proposes a framework by which to detect collusion attacks in security protocols. The possibility of security threats from insiders is especially taken into account. The case study demonstrates that our methods are useful and promising in discovering and preventing collusion attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP0449535
dc.relation.ispartof	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing	en_US
dc.title	Detecting collusion attacks in security protocols	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	3841 LNCS	en_US
utslib.for	0803 Computer Software	en_US
dc.location.activity	Harbin, China	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (International)
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - ACRI - Australia China Relations Institute
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CAI - Centre for Artificial Intelligence
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	3841 LNCS	en_US

Abstract:

Security protocols have been widely used to safeguard secure electronic transactions. We usually assume that principals are credible and shall not maliciously disclose their individual secrets to someone else. Nevertheless, it is impractical to completely ignore the possibility that some principals may collude in private to achieve a fraudulent or illegal purpose. Therefore, it is critical to address the possibility of collusion attacks in order to correctly analyse security protocols. This paper proposes a framework by which to detect collusion attacks in security protocols. The possibility of security threats from insiders is especially taken into account. The case study demonstrates that our methods are useful and promising in discovering and preventing collusion attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/4936