A Framework for Confronting Key-swapping Collusion Attack on Random Pairwise Key pre-distribution schemes for distributed sensor networks

Publisher:
IEEE
Publication Type:
Conference
Citation:
Proceedings of 4th IEEE International Workshop on Wireless and Sensor, 2008, pp. 815 - 820
Issue Date:
2008-01
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Random pairwise key pre-distribution schemes have been adopted extensively as a preferred approach to pairwise key agreement problem in distributed sensor networks. However, their practical applicability is threatened by the key-swapping collusion attack whose goal is to ruin critical applications that require collaborative efforts. In this paper, we propose a light-weight framework for thwarting the attack. Our framework is a winning combination of intermittent deployment strategy and one-way hash chain. The framework thereby evades undesirable requirements of functionalities and resources, topological pre-deployment knowledge, or costly location-based detection algorithms, yet maintaining network scalability. Moreover, the in-depth analysis shows in the optimistic situation the framework not only completely defeats the attack but also diminishes usability of non-collusion compromised nodes to attackers. Meanwhile, it still maintains network resilience at a remarkable level in the worst situation. Finally, the performance overheads are analysed to be acceptable for use in the current sensor node generation.
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