Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making: the case of local government reform in New South Wales

Drew, J; Grant, B

Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making: the case of local government reform in New South Wales

Drew, J

Grant, B

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Australian Journal of Political Science, 2017, 52 (1), pp. 37 - 52
Issue Date:: 2017-01-02

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Drew, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3579-5758	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Grant, B https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8055-6046	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:10:29Z
dc.date.issued	2017-01-02	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Australian Journal of Political Science, 2017, 52 (1), pp. 37 - 52	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1036-1146	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/51734
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 Australian Political Studies Association. Politicians often use ‘independent experts’ to avoid blame for contentious public policy. The use of multiple agents, however, has attracted relatively little attention. We extend the blame-avoidance literature to identify additional opportunities and risks that arise when multiple agents are used to support/oppose particular public policies. We then test our propositions using evidence from recent local government reforms in New South Wales. The picture which emerges is largely one of confusion whereby independent agents provide contradictory opinions, attempt to shift blame to one another, and dispute interpretations of earlier advice. We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the salient factors for successful pursuit of the multiple-agent variant of the blame games.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Australian Journal of Political Science	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1080/10361146.2016.1238872	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Political Science & Public Administration	en_US
dc.title	Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making: the case of local government reform in New South Wales	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	52	en_US
utslib.for	1605 Policy and Administration	en_US
utslib.for	1606 Political Science	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (Research)
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/DVC (Research)/lnstitute for Public Policy and Governance
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - IPPG - Institute for Public Policy and Governance
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	52	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 Australian Political Studies Association. Politicians often use ‘independent experts’ to avoid blame for contentious public policy. The use of multiple agents, however, has attracted relatively little attention. We extend the blame-avoidance literature to identify additional opportunities and risks that arise when multiple agents are used to support/oppose particular public policies. We then test our propositions using evidence from recent local government reforms in New South Wales. The picture which emerges is largely one of confusion whereby independent agents provide contradictory opinions, attempt to shift blame to one another, and dispute interpretations of earlier advice. We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the salient factors for successful pursuit of the multiple-agent variant of the blame games.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/51734