Restoring the 'Real' to Real Property Law: A Return to Blackstone?

Graham, NG

Restoring the 'Real' to Real Property Law: A Return to Blackstone?

Graham, NG

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Publisher:: Hart Publishing
Publication Type:: Chapter
Citation:: Blackstone and his Commentaries Biography, Law, History, 2009, 1, pp. 151 - 168
Issue Date:: 2009-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Graham, NG https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4428-8830	en_US
dc.contributor.editor	Wilfred Prest	en_US
dc.date.issued	2009-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Blackstone and his Commentaries Biography, Law, History, 2009, 1, pp. 151 - 168	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9781841137964	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/8109
dc.description.abstract	JEREMY BENTHAM REGARDED William Blackstone's work as a 'striking example of the inability of the common law to provide adequate definitions of property. He attributed this in part to the bifurcated categories of 'real' and 'personal' property that Blackstone embraced-and which Bentham dismissed as an obsolete structure, inherited from and particular to the feudal context. For Blackstone, property was a relation between a 'person' and a 'thing'. For Bentham, property was an abstract relation between persons-it was thus 'metaphysical ... a mere conception of the mind" The loss of the 'thing' in the property equation, known as the dephysicalisation of property! has served and facilitated a market economy in which 'things' are regarded and traded not for their 'thingness' but for their value as commodities. The dephysicalisation of property was the most important development in the modern history of property law and indeed, is central to the current market economy it facilitates and protects.	en_US
dc.publisher	Hart Publishing	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Blackstone and his Commentaries Biography, Law, History	en_US
dc.title	Restoring the 'Real' to Real Property Law: A Return to Blackstone?	en_US
dc.type	Chapter
utslib.location	Oxford, UK	en_US
utslib.for	180124 Property Law (excl. Intellectual Property Law)	en_US
utslib.citation.edition	1	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.edition	1	en_US
pubs.place-of-publication	Oxford, UK	en_US

Abstract:

JEREMY BENTHAM REGARDED William Blackstone's work as a 'striking example of the inability of the common law to provide adequate definitions of property. He attributed this in part to the bifurcated categories of 'real' and 'personal' property that Blackstone embraced-and which Bentham dismissed as an obsolete structure, inherited from and particular to the feudal context. For Blackstone, property was a relation between a 'person' and a 'thing'. For Bentham, property was an abstract relation between persons-it was thus 'metaphysical ... a mere conception of the mind" The loss of the 'thing' in the property equation, known as the dephysicalisation of property! has served and facilitated a market economy in which 'things' are regarded and traded not for their 'thingness' but for their value as commodities. The dephysicalisation of property was the most important development in the modern history of property law and indeed, is central to the current market economy it facilitates and protects.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/8109