On not speaking: The right to silence, the gagged trial judge and the spectre of child sexual abuse

Biber, K

On not speaking: The right to silence, the gagged trial judge and the spectre of child sexual abuse

Biber, K

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Publisher:: Legal Service Bulletin Co-op
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: The Alternative Law Journal, 2005, 30 (1), pp. 19 - 23
Issue Date:: 2005-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Biber, K https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2189-3157	en_US
dc.date.issued	2005-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	The Alternative Law Journal, 2005, 30 (1), pp. 19 - 23	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1037-969X	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/869
dc.description.abstract	Is there a right to silence for people accused of crimes? What is the .extent of that right? The right to silence co-exists with the presumption of innocence; both are long-standing principles which have come to be given their effect through rather narrow technical procedures. In NSW and federally these principles are implemented through s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995, and the interpretation of s 20 in some of the cases discussed in this article. In criminal matters, the Crown bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused to the requisite standard: beyond a~y reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to be presumed innocent unless and until that standard has been met. The accused need not do anything in their own defence, and under s 20 the failure of the defendant to give evidence does not entitle a trial judge to Comment in any way that suggests the defendant has failed to give evidence because they are, or believe they are, guilty of the offence.	en_US
dc.publisher	Legal Service Bulletin Co-op	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	The Alternative Law Journal	en_US
dc.title	On not speaking: The right to silence, the gagged trial judge and the spectre of child sexual abuse	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	30	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
utslib.for	1606 Political Science	en_US
utslib.for	2201 Applied Ethics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/e-Press
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	false	en_US
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.volume	30	en_US

Abstract:

Is there a right to silence for people accused of crimes? What is the .extent of that right? The right to silence co-exists with the presumption of innocence; both are long-standing principles which have come to be given their effect through rather narrow technical procedures. In NSW and federally these principles are implemented through s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995, and the interpretation of s 20 in some of the cases discussed in this article. In criminal matters, the Crown bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused to the requisite standard: beyond a~y reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to be presumed innocent unless and until that standard has been met. The accused need not do anything in their own defence, and under s 20 the failure of the defendant to give evidence does not entitle a trial judge to Comment in any way that suggests the defendant has failed to give evidence because they are, or believe they are, guilty of the offence.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/869