Spectrum sharing based on truthful auction in licensed shared access systems

Wang, H; Dutkiewicz, E; Fang, G; Mueck, MD

Spectrum sharing based on truthful auction in licensed shared access systems

Wang, H Dutkiewicz, E

Fang, G Mueck, MD

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: 2015 IEEE 82nd Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2015 - Proceedings, 2016
Issue Date:: 2016-01-25

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wang, H	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Dutkiewicz, E https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4268-9286	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Fang, G	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Mueck, MD	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-01-25	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	2015 IEEE 82nd Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2015 - Proceedings, 2016	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9781479980918	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/96776
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 IEEE. The explosion of different types of wireless communications is leading to an impending spectrum famine. As a result, spectrum sharing has gained increasing interest from governments, industry and regulators, such as FCC in US and CEPT in Europe. Licensed Shared Access (LSA), developed by CEPT and ETSI, is a concept for an efficient use of current spectrum resources to enable keeping pace with increasing mobile data usage demands. In this paper, we present a truthful auction mechanism for spectrum sharing based on the LSA concept. This proposal is to allocate Incumbents' idle spectrum to Licensee Access Points from different operators for the purpose of commerce. We give insights into spectrum allocation methods based on auction mechanisms to obtain high revenue to attract Incumbents to join in the LSA architecture and operators to offload data from primary spectrum band. The proposed LSA Auction (LSAA) mechanism combines independent set selection by bidding and an elaborately designed group bid called Rank-bid, which further improves the revenue compared to related allocation methods. Our simulation results show that LSAA results in enhanced performance for Incumbent revenue and Licensee satisfaction.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	2015 IEEE 82nd Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2015 - Proceedings	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/VTCFall.2015.7391152	en_US
dc.title	Spectrum sharing based on truthful auction in licensed shared access systems	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.for	0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 IEEE. The explosion of different types of wireless communications is leading to an impending spectrum famine. As a result, spectrum sharing has gained increasing interest from governments, industry and regulators, such as FCC in US and CEPT in Europe. Licensed Shared Access (LSA), developed by CEPT and ETSI, is a concept for an efficient use of current spectrum resources to enable keeping pace with increasing mobile data usage demands. In this paper, we present a truthful auction mechanism for spectrum sharing based on the LSA concept. This proposal is to allocate Incumbents' idle spectrum to Licensee Access Points from different operators for the purpose of commerce. We give insights into spectrum allocation methods based on auction mechanisms to obtain high revenue to attract Incumbents to join in the LSA architecture and operators to offload data from primary spectrum band. The proposed LSA Auction (LSAA) mechanism combines independent set selection by bidding and an elaborately designed group bid called Rank-bid, which further improves the revenue compared to related allocation methods. Our simulation results show that LSAA results in enhanced performance for Incumbent revenue and Licensee satisfaction.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/96776