Option awards for Australian CEOs: The who, what and why

Coulton, J; Taylor, S

Option awards for Australian CEOs: The who, what and why

Coulton, J Taylor, S

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Australian Accounting Review, 2002, 12 (26), pp. 25 - 35
Issue Date:: 2002-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Coulton, J	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Taylor, S https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8870-4966	en_US
dc.date.issued	2002-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Australian Accounting Review, 2002, 12 (26), pp. 25 - 35	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1035-6908	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10054
dc.description.abstract	The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of “rent extraction” by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules. © 2002 CPA Australia.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/A79803591
dc.relation.ispartof	Australian Accounting Review	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/j.1835-2561.2002.tb00192.x	en_US
dc.title	Option awards for Australian CEOs: The who, what and why	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	26	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	12	en_US
utslib.for	150303 Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Engagement	en_US
utslib.for	150103 Financial Accounting	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1499 Other Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	26	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	12	en_US

Abstract:

The compensation structure for Australian CEOs, and especially the extent to which they receive executive stock options, is explored. Evidence suggests that the award of executive stock options is common in Australia, but not in as systematic a manner as has been documented for US CEOs. Where ESOs are awarded, they form a significant component of total compensation, even allowing for limitations in the way we approximate their value. Modelling the use of ESOs shows relatively few empirical regularities, other than a positive association between firm size and ESO use. This is consistent with a view that ESOs are a form of “rent extraction” by CEOs, but it may also reflect a bias towards their use created by accounting rules. © 2002 CPA Australia.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10054