Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal

Bird, R; Gray, J

Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal

Bird, R

Gray, J

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Publisher:: International Centre for Pension Management
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 2009, 2 (2), pp. 36 - 40
Issue Date:: 2009-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Bird, R https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0524-9377	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Gray, J	en_US
dc.date.issued	2009-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 2009, 2 (2), pp. 36 - 40	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1916-9833	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10142
dc.description.abstract	The single-minded aim of retirement savings policy is to maximize after-cost returns to members while providing products and services to meet individual needs. In that it fails. The dominant cause of failure is ineffective and unnecessary competition. The dominant solution is greater cooperation. This article demonstrates how excessive competition has undermined investors ability to save for retirement through inefficient pricing, agency costs, and excessive choice. To ensure more cooperation, and less competition, the authors propose a three-pronged approach: structuring management arrangements to extract maximum economic growth and investment returns; taking steps to rid the system of over-servicing; and, structuring relationships to minimize agency costs. While the authors use Australia as their institutional setting, their (im)modest, and likely (un)popular proposal has universal (un)appeal and applicability.	en_US
dc.publisher	International Centre for Pension Management	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Rotman International Journal of Pension Management	en_US
dc.title	Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.for	150201 Finance	en_US
utslib.for	140207 Financial Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Finance Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.volume	2	en_US

Abstract:

The single-minded aim of retirement savings policy is to maximize after-cost returns to members while providing products and services to meet individual needs. In that it fails. The dominant cause of failure is ineffective and unnecessary competition. The dominant solution is greater cooperation. This article demonstrates how excessive competition has undermined investors ability to save for retirement through inefficient pricing, agency costs, and excessive choice. To ensure more cooperation, and less competition, the authors propose a three-pronged approach: structuring management arrangements to extract maximum economic growth and investment returns; taking steps to rid the system of over-servicing; and, structuring relationships to minimize agency costs. While the authors use Australia as their institutional setting, their (im)modest, and likely (un)popular proposal has universal (un)appeal and applicability.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10142