Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal

Publisher:
International Centre for Pension Management
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Citation:
Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 2009, 2 (2), pp. 36 - 40
Issue Date:
2009-01
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The single-minded aim of retirement savings policy is to maximize after-cost returns to members while providing products and services to meet individual needs. In that it fails. The dominant cause of failure is ineffective and unnecessary competition. The dominant solution is greater cooperation. This article demonstrates how excessive competition has undermined investors ability to save for retirement through inefficient pricing, agency costs, and excessive choice. To ensure more cooperation, and less competition, the authors propose a three-pronged approach: structuring management arrangements to extract maximum economic growth and investment returns; taking steps to rid the system of over-servicing; and, structuring relationships to minimize agency costs. While the authors use Australia as their institutional setting, their (im)modest, and likely (un)popular proposal has universal (un)appeal and applicability.
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