Directors' recommendations on takeover bids and the management of earnings: Evidence from Australian takeovers

Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia
Publication Type:
Journal Article
Abacus: a journal of accounting, finance and business studies, 1999, 35 (1), pp. 29 - 45
Issue Date:
Full metadata record
Files in This Item:
Filename Description SizeFormat
2007003396OK.pdf1.01 MBAdobe PDF
This article investigates whether Australian companies manage their earnings during takeover bids in a manner consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that directors who reject a bid use accrual accounting to increase current earnings, supporting their claim that the bid, relative to earnings, is inadequate. Likewise, directors who accept a bid are predicted to use accrual accounting to decrease current earnings. Overall, the results are not consistent with the earnings-management hypothesis. However, some components of unexpected accruals (our proxy for managed earnings) change in the direction predicted by the earnings-management hypothesis, although these changes are not statistically significant. Using industry adjusted performance measures the conclusion is that unexpected accruals are primarily a manifestation of poor financial performance of target firms in the period leading up to the takeover bid.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: