Incentives for auditor collusion in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory environment

Brown, A

Incentives for auditor collusion in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory environment

Brown, A

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Publisher:: Federation Press
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Law in Context, 2008, 25 (2), pp. 178 - 212
Issue Date:: 2008-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Brown, A	en_US
dc.date.issued	2008-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Law in Context, 2008, 25 (2), pp. 178 - 212	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0811-5796	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10478
dc.description.abstract	This article develops a single-play game theory model that looks at the strategic interactions between auditors and managers. The article adds to the literature by explicitly modelling the possibility of collusion in a context where the outcome is unverifiable and the manager has the possibility of funding side-payments in such a way that they have little effect on his personal payoff.	en_US
dc.publisher	Federation Press	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Law in Context	en_US
dc.title	Incentives for auditor collusion in a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory environment	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	25	en_US
utslib.for	1801 Law	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.consider-herdc	false	en_US
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.volume	25	en_US

Abstract:

This article develops a single-play game theory model that looks at the strategic interactions between auditors and managers. The article adds to the literature by explicitly modelling the possibility of collusion in a context where the outcome is unverifiable and the manager has the possibility of funding side-payments in such a way that they have little effect on his personal payoff.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/10478