Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason, TN; Sheremeta, RM; Zhang, J

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason, TN Sheremeta, RM Zhang, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76 (1), pp. 26 - 43
Issue Date:: 2012-09-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Cason, TN	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Sheremeta, RM	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3274-5245	en_US
dc.date.issued	2012-09-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76 (1), pp. 26 - 43	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/113839
dc.description.abstract	Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency. This contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes. © 2012 Elsevier Inc..	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.001	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory	en_US
dc.title	Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	76	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	76	en_US

Abstract:

Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency. This contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes. © 2012 Elsevier Inc..

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/113839