How groups reach agreement in risky choices: An experiment

Zhang, J; Casari, M

How groups reach agreement in risky choices: An experiment

Zhang, J

Casari, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Inquiry, 2012, 50 (2), pp. 502 - 515
Issue Date:: 2012-04-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Zhang, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3274-5245	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Casari, M	en_US
dc.date.issued	2012-04-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Inquiry, 2012, 50 (2), pp. 502 - 515	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0095-2583	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/113840
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals'. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality, and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group. © 2011 Western Economic Association International.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Inquiry	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00362.x	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	How groups reach agreement in risky choices: An experiment	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	50	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	50	en_US

Abstract:

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals'. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality, and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group. © 2011 Western Economic Association International.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/113840