A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

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Journal Article
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (2), pp. 699 - 708
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In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense that all full winners' values are above all full losers' values. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
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