In Praise of (Some) Red Tape: A New Approach to Regulation

Menzies, G; Dixon, P; Rimmer, M

In Praise of (Some) Red Tape: A New Approach to Regulation

Menzies, G

Dixon, P Rimmer, M

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economic Record, 2016, 92 (299), pp. 631 - 647
Issue Date:: 2016-12-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Menzies, G https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4133-2282	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Dixon, P	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Rimmer, M	en_US
dc.date.issued	2016-12-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Record, 2016, 92 (299), pp. 631 - 647	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0013-0249	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122926
dc.description.abstract	© 2016 Economic Society of Australia The costs of removing red tape include a lower chance of detecting recession-generating flaws in the financial system. What we call independent dimensions of regulation (IDRs) operate more or less independently from other groupings. If an IDR's optimality is unknown, it may be risky to remove. Uncertainty thus implies that (some) red tape – a small amount of overregulation – is justified, in contrast to the Brainard principle that uncertainty dictates less policy activism. The long-run Gross Domestic Product (GDP) benefit of a 1 per cent improvement in financial services productivity is 0.06 per cent in our computable general equilibrium model. These relatively modest gains reinforce our conclusion.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economic Record	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/1475-4932.12283	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	In Praise of (Some) Red Tape: A New Approach to Regulation	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	299	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	92	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
utslib.for	15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	299	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	92	en_US

Abstract:

© 2016 Economic Society of Australia The costs of removing red tape include a lower chance of detecting recession-generating flaws in the financial system. What we call independent dimensions of regulation (IDRs) operate more or less independently from other groupings. If an IDR's optimality is unknown, it may be risky to remove. Uncertainty thus implies that (some) red tape – a small amount of overregulation – is justified, in contrast to the Brainard principle that uncertainty dictates less policy activism. The long-run Gross Domestic Product (GDP) benefit of a 1 per cent improvement in financial services productivity is 0.06 per cent in our computable general equilibrium model. These relatively modest gains reinforce our conclusion.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/122926