Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

Moreno, D; Wooders, J

Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

Moreno, D Wooders, J

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Economics Letters, 2017, 154 pp. 6 - 9
Issue Date:: 2017-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Moreno, D	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-05-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Economics Letters, 2017, 154 pp. 6 - 9	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0165-1765	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/124423
dc.description.abstract	© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller's cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rP<rS. Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c<rP<rS<r0.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Economics Letters	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.006	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Economics	en_US
dc.title	Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	154	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
utslib.for	14 Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	154	en_US

Abstract:

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller's cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rP

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