De finetti and savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: A reply to arthmar and brady

Feduzi, A; Runde, J; Zappia, C

De finetti and savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: A reply to arthmar and brady

Feduzi, A

Runde, J Zappia, C

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: History of Economic Ideas, 2017, 25 (1), pp. 211 - 223
Issue Date:: 2017-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Feduzi, A https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7950-1363	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Runde, J	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Zappia, C	en_US
dc.date.issued	2017-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	History of Economic Ideas, 2017, 25 (1), pp. 211 - 223	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1122-8792	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127579
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage totally rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	History of Economic Ideas	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.19272/201706101009	en_US
dc.title	De finetti and savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: A reply to arthmar and brady	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	25	en_US
utslib.for	1499 Other Economics	en_US
utslib.for	2202 History and Philosophy of Specific Fields	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	25	en_US

Abstract:

This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage totally rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127579