The influence of powerful non-executive Chairs in Mergers and acquisitions

Ghannam, S; Matolcsy, ZP; Spiropoulos, H; Thai, N

The influence of powerful non-executive Chairs in Mergers and acquisitions

Ghannam, S

Matolcsy, ZP

Spiropoulos, H

Thai, N

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2019, 15 (1), pp. 87 - 104
Issue Date:: 2019-04-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ghannam, S https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7956-2182	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Matolcsy, ZP https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6566-5079	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Spiropoulos, H https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7748-6577	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Thai, N	en_US
dc.date.available	2021-01-01T18:04:53Z
dc.date.issued	2019-04-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2019, 15 (1), pp. 87 - 104	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1815-5669	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/128350
dc.description.abstract	© 2018 Elsevier Ltd This paper examines the influence of the non-executive Chair of bidding firms on various takeover outcomes. We study this in the Australian context due to its unique institutional setting where only 5% of Chair and CEO roles are combined, compared to 60% in the U.S. Based on a sample of 316 acquisitions by ASX listed firms between 2004 and 2014, we find that firms with a powerful Chair pay lower bid premiums and are also less likely to revise the initial offer price. Furthermore, Chair power is found to have a positive association with the bidding firm's market reaction to the takeover announcement. Our evidence is robust with respect to alternative tests and variable specifications.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jcae.2018.12.003	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title	The influence of powerful non-executive Chairs in Mergers and acquisitions	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	15	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	15	en_US

Abstract:

© 2018 Elsevier Ltd This paper examines the influence of the non-executive Chair of bidding firms on various takeover outcomes. We study this in the Australian context due to its unique institutional setting where only 5% of Chair and CEO roles are combined, compared to 60% in the U.S. Based on a sample of 316 acquisitions by ASX listed firms between 2004 and 2014, we find that firms with a powerful Chair pay lower bid premiums and are also less likely to revise the initial offer price. Furthermore, Chair power is found to have a positive association with the bidding firm's market reaction to the takeover announcement. Our evidence is robust with respect to alternative tests and variable specifications.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/128350